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THE  ADEQUACY  of industrial capacity has not been a central concern of 
postwar  stabilization  policy. Aggregate-demand  targets,  such as potential 
gross  national  product,  have typically  been defined  with reference  only to 
labor-market  conditions.  While  emphasizing  the balance  between  supply 
and demand,  most studies  of inflation  have taken  the unemployment  rate 
of labor  as the primary  measure  of resource  utilization.  Although  there  has 
been considerable  interest  in tax and monetary  measures  to promote  in- 
vestment,  they  often  have  been  used  within  a policy  framework  that  focuses 
on short-run  aggregate-demand  objectives  rather  than  on future  increments 
to capacity. 
The emphasis  upon demand  rather  than supply  in stabilization  policy 
reflects,  in part,  the conclusions  of prior  empirical  studies.  Many  inflation 
studies  have attributed  a relatively  minor role to cyclical  fluctuations  in 
capacity  utilization,  broadly  measured,  and serious  difficulties  arise  in de- 
fining  a measurable  concept of aggregate  capacity.  Previously  observed 
variations  in aggregate  investment  rates also appear  to have had only 
modest  effects  upon  the growth  of output  per  manhour  and  thus  the growth 
of potential  output. 
Note: I am grateful  to James  Altman, Merriann  M. Panarella,  and Andrea  V. Mills 
for research  assistance  in the preparation  of this report.  Daryl Smith,  of Temple,  Barker, 
and Sloane,  Inc., and Peter  Oliver,  of Arthur  D. Little, Inc., were  generous  in answering 
questions  about  their  reports  to the Environmental  Protection  Agency.  Also, I would  like 
to thank  Lawrence  Forest of the Federal  Reserve  Board  staff for data and information 
about capacity  measures. 
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The experience of severe shortages and large price increases for some 
commodities in 1973-74, however, has given rise to widespread discussions 
of the scarcity of industrial capacity and forecasts of a recurrence of the 
1973 supply difficulties as the current expansion continues. In addition, 
sharp increases in costs of capital goods, of pollution abatement, and of 
borrowing have stirred doubts about the  ability of  industry to  expand 
capacity to meet future needs. 
On the other hand, notions  of a general capacity shortage were chal- 
lenged in a previous article in this journal by George Perry.' He examined 
the analytical value of the three major measures of the utilization rate, 
compiled by the Federal Reserve Board, McGraw-Hill, and the Wharton 
School economic forecasting unit. Of these, only the Wharton index, based 
on extrapolation of past trends, appeared to indicate serious capacity pres- 
sures in  1973. The McGraw-Hill index, which Perry found reliable in a 
variety of  analytical applications, remained significantly below  its  1966 
peak of 91 percent. And even Perry's finding of a modest slowing of capac- 
ity  growth in  manufacturing after  1966 is  largely eliminated by  recent 
upward revisions in the production indexes.2 
More specific evidence of capacity shortages is provided by the Federal 
Reserve Board utilization index for basic materials, which reached a peak 
of 93.5 percent in 1973, a rate previously approached only for short periods 
in 1951 and 1966.3  While the basic-materials index accounts for only 8.5 
percent of overall industrial production on a value-added basis, it repre- 
sents a key set of industries and includes nearly all of those sectors for 
which shortages of capacity were suspected in 1973. 
The behavior of prices in these industries supports the evidence of scar- 
city: overall, they rose 16 percent in 1973 and 35 percent in 1974. Even if 
refined petroleum products are excluded, the rates of increase were 11 and 
1. George L. Perry,  "Capacity  in Manufacturing,"  BPEA, 3:19  73, pp. 701-42. 
2. One measure  of aggregate  manufacturing  capacity  can be obtained  by dividing  the 
McGraw-Hill  utilization  rate into the FRB index of production  for December  of each 
year.  Growth  in capacity,  as estimated  on the basis  of the revised  production  index,  gives 
no evidence  of slowing, since it averaged  4.7 percent  annually  between  1955-65 and 4.6 
percent  for the 1965-75 period.  There  is, on the other hand, a slowing of the growth  of 
capacity  relative  to the capital  stock after 1969.  This can be attributed  only in part  to the 
inclusion  of pollution-abatement  expenditures  in the capital  stock and the induced  clos- 
ing of older,  heavily  polluting  plants.  But the argument  that the McGraw-Hill  utilization 
index overstated  aggregate  excess capacity  in 1973 would magnify  this implied decline 
in the growth  of capacity  relative  to the capital  stock with no evidence  that the decline 
reflects  greater  factor substitution. 
3. This index includes  all or part  of the following  industries:  steel, copper,  aluminum, 
cement,  plywood, paper  and paperboard,  textiles, chemicals,  and petroleum  refining. Barry Bosworth  299 
35 percent in 1973 and 1974, respectively.4  These price increases are par- 
ticularly  large in an historical context: the annual rise in the index averaged 
less than 1 percent over the 1960-70 period. 
The present concern with the inadequacy of industrial capacity seems to 
reflect problems in 1973-74 in a relatively small set of primary-materials 
industries. There are several reasons for expecting capacity limitations to 
be most meaningful for these industries. First, they are process-related in- 
dustries, in which the concept of a physical limitation on output would be 
expected to  have the greatest significance. For  much of  the rest of  the 
economy, production can be increased with a given capital stock by adding 
workshifts, or workers on a given shift. Costs per unit produced may rise, 
but probably only gradually. Thus, estimates of capacity output by indi- 
vidual firms, which cannot accurately project the availability of labor and 
other variable factors, may be a dubious concept of limited economic sig- 
nificance. In many of the basic-materials industries, such opportunities to 
expand output a-re  more limited, because production processes are main- 
tained around the clock normally and technological constraints limit the 
substitution of variable for fixed factors of production. 
Second, new pollution-abatement regulations have had  a pronounced 
impact on the primary-materials  industries. Allegedly, measures taken to 
comply have absorbed large amounts of investment funds that otherwise 
would have been used to expand capacity, and uncertainty about the regu- 
lations has delayed expansion plans. 
Third, these are highly capital-intensive  industries, which have been par- 
ticularly affected by  the substantial increases in capital-goods prices in 
recent years. Thus, investment in new capacity may have been inhibited as 
firms sought more concrete evidence that product prices would rise suf- 
ficiently relative to variable costs to cover higher capital costs. 
Finally, because the construction of new capacity normally requires sev- 
eral years, these industries face the special uncertainties of  anticipating 
demand that long into the future. The last decade has been a chaotic period 
for the U.S. economy and the abrupt swings in demand between boom and 
bust increased  the likelihood of planning mistakes that could not be quickly 
corrected. 
4. The estimated  rates of price  increase  are based on a constructed  price  index using 
categories  of the wholesale  price  index that correspond  as much as possible  to tlhe  indus- 
tries included  in the basic-materials  production  index. The existence  of price  controls  in 
1973 may have affected  the distribution  of price increases  between  the years 1973 and 
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In this  paper  an attempt  will  be made  to evaluate  the adequacy  of capac- 
ity in three  industries:  steel,  aluminum,  and paper.  These  are  industries  in 
which  capacity  restrictions  were  said to be a serious  problem  in 1973  and 
whose ability  to expand  capacity  in future  years without  large price in- 
creases  or special  government  assistance  has often  been  the subject  of con- 
cern.  They  are  also industries  for which  a meaningful  measure  of capacity 
is available,  based upon a physical  concept of machine  availability.  A 
major  purpose  of the study  is to determine  whether  an examination  of in- 
dividual  industries  can offer  insights  into the issue of capacity  growth  and 
capital  needs  that are not evident  in more aggregative  analysis. 
Capacity  Imbalances  in 1973 
Steel,  aluminum,  and paper  all experienced  capacity  problems  in 1973- 
74. Yet the significance  of that episode  for the future  depends  upon one's 
beliefs  about  the  factors  underlying  any  shortgages  that occurred.  Sonle  see 
the episode  as a simple  reflection  of excessive  aggregate-demand  stimulus. 
Others  stress  the major  structural  changes  during  the period-devaluation, 
wage and price  controls,  specific  shortgages  induced  by bad weather  and 
the oil embargo,  and a large burst of speculative  activity  in world com- 
modity  markets-a coincidence  of special  events  that is unlikely  to recur. 
On these grounds,  special  supply-oriented  measures  would  not be the ap- 
propriate  remedy.  To still other observers,  the period indicates  a major 
crisis of inadequate  capacity.  They foresee  expansion  severely  restricted 
because  of low current  profits,  large  increases  in capital  costs,  the diversion 
of limited  investment  funds  into pollution-abatement  facilities,  and the in- 
ability  of firms  in these  industries  to raise  the required  funds  in the capital 
markets. 
Although  the circumstances  of individual  industries  differed  somewhat, 
several  general  conclusions  can be drawn.  First,  the 1972-73  recovery  was 
unusual  in the extent  to which  it was an expansion  led by durable  goods 
with  a consequent  high  demand  for  basic  metals.  While  real  GNP expanded 
5.7 percent  in 1972  and 5.3 percent  in 1973,  durable-goods  output  rose by 
13.6  and 12.5  percent,  respectively.  As figure  1  shows,  in 1973  durable-goods 
output  reached  its highest  share  of nonfarm  business  output  since  World 
War  II. Moreover,  the change  in the share  between  the  low of 1971  and  the 
peak of 1973  exceeded  that of the 1955  expansion  and itself is exceeded 
only by the shift  that accompanied  the 1950-51  Korean  War  buildup. I-'W 
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Second, by the time the demand surge came, capacity growth had slowed 
in all these industries; in some it had been slow for years. This slow growth 
may be traced to the impact of the 1970 recession upon incentives to ex- 
pand; declining profitability in the late 1960s; and, perhaps, the need to 
meet tighter pollution standards. 
Third, these general conditions were reinforced by special factors in each 
industry which resulted from devaluation, power shortages, a coincident 
worldwide economic boom,  and price-wage controls. The strong demand 
pressures  in 1973 were translated into an intense and speculative inventory 
buildup in early 1974 that sustained production in these industries well 
after the point of general economic decline; but, once the fears of shortage 
had passed, the accumulation of excess inventories in 1974 greatly intensi- 
fied the following drop in production. 
STEEL 
The tight supply conditions within the steel industry in 1973 reflected  the 
sudden and large surge in the demand for durable goods, the devaluation 
of the dollar in 1973, strong world demand for steel, and the absence of 
any significant growth in the capacity of the domestic steel industry during 
the previous decade. 
In the years prior to  1972, most of the growth in demand was met by 
foreign supply. Apparent consumption of steel products rose from 81.8 
million tons in 1955 to an average of  102.5 million tons in 1968-70 (see 
table 1).5 This amounted to an average annual growth of 1.7 percent com- 
pared with only 0.7 percent for doinestic shipments over the same period; 
the net export position of the industry changed from a surplus of 2.9 million 
tons in 1955 to a deficit of  15.5 million tons in 1971, a shift equal to 21 
percent of  1971 shipments. As  a result of its inability to  compete with 
foreign producers, the domestic steel industry was plagued with excess ca- 
pacity throughout the 1960s and nearly all of its investment was directed 
toward modernizing existing facilities. The results were an increase in the 
capacity to produce raw steel of only 4 percent between 1960 and 1972 
and a sharp shift in the composition of production toward the basic-oxygen 
and electric furnaces. The proportion of production accounted for by the 
open-hearth and Bessemer processes declined from 88 percent in 1960 to 
5. Apparent  consumption  is defined  as purchases  by consuming  industries.  Thus it 
includes  metal added to users'  inventories  as well as that consumed  in production. Barry Bosworth  303 
24 percent in 1974. By the time of the 1971 devaluation, most of the excess 
capacity was eliminated and operating rates in the industry were com- 
parable to those in the rest of manufacturing. 
The steel industry  was faced with a sudden and largely unanticipated  rise 
in demand in the years 1972-74. As table 1 reveals, the strong expansion 
of the economy brought a 15 percent increase in domestic consumption of 
steel products in 1973. In addition, net imports declined sharply in both 
1972 and 1973, so that domestic shipments expanded 21.4 percent in 1973. 
This huge growth in demand appears to have raised the utilization of steel 
capacity to rates matched only during the Korean War. 
A  simple regression relationship between apparent steel consumption 
and the durable-goods and construction components of  GNP  was esti- 
mated as a means of determining normal demand. The comparison of ac- 
tual and predicted consumption implies that the growth in demand in 1972 
and 1973 was fully consistent with the expansion of economic activity in 
industries that are heavy consumers of steel products. Changes in durable- 
goods output and in steel consumption of this magnitude are consistent 
with those in the economic recoveries of 1955 and 1959. But the pressures 
in 1973 were intensified by the sharp decline in net imports and the absence 
of a large backlog of unused capacity. 
The equation implied that apparent consumption was unusually high in 
1974 and abnormally low in 1975; but most of this deviation of actual from 
estimated consumption can be traced to inventory movements that were 
the direct outgrowth of the 1973 capacity pressures.6  Steel inventories of 
manufacturers rose 22 percent in  1974 and declined 23 percent in  1975. 
Thus, a speculative demand for steel (purchases in excess of immediate 
needs) appears to be an important explanation for the maintenance of high 
levels of production in 1974. A strong growth in the consumption of steel 
in 1973 pushed the industry to full utilization of capacity, initiated fears of 
shortages, and caused a burst of speculative inventory accumulation that 
maintained demand at high levels well into 1974. The speculative demand 
pressures  are also evident in a backlog of unfilled orders equal to 28 percent 
of annual shipments at the end of 1973 compared with 15 percent and 14 
percent, respectively, in the high-demand years of 1969 and 1966. The re- 
6. A special survey  of steel consumption  and inventories  in manufacturing  has been 
reported  on  a monthly  basis  since  1961. See Survey of Current Buisiness, vol.  56 (June 
1976), p. S-32, and previous  issues. Similar  data are not available  for other steel con- 
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sulting buildup of excessive inventory in the face of declining general eco- 
nomic activity led to an enormous drop in steel shipments in  1975 to  a 
level 28 percent below those of 1973. 
Because the rest of the world was in the midst of a strong economic ex- 
pansion in 1973 and also encountered tight steel capacity, it is difficult to 
estimate precisely the contribution of devaluation to the change in the net 
export position after 1971. But it appears  to have been an important factor: 
as table 1 shows, the share of imports in domestic consumption increased 
very little in the 1975 recession, compared with 1973, and remained far be- 
low the share reached in 1971, the previous year of excess world capacity. 
ALUMINUM 
The physical capacity of plant forms a particularly  rigid ceiling for pro- 
duction in the primary aluminum industry because reduction plants (for 
the conversion of alumina to aluminum) are normally operated around the 
clock with limited opportunities to produce in excess of rated capacity.7 In 
contrast to steel, domestic aluminum shipments have grown very rapidly 
throughout the postwar period, averaging 7.2 percent a year between 1950 
and 1974. Domestic production was augmented throughout the 1950s by 
heavy inflows of  aluminum into the government stockpile; these stocks 
peaked at 2 million tons in 1963, but in subsequent years government poli- 
cies have changed and they have been largely depleted. In years of high 
demand about 75 percent of the total domestic supply is accounted for by 
primary production;  secondary recovery (recycled  scrap) and  a  small 
amount of imports provide the remainder. 
In addition to the strong secular growth rate, aluminum demand is highly 
cyclical. As a restult,  the industry has had problems in accurately anticipat- 
ing demand the three to four years into the future required  to construct new 
plants. This is reflected in periodic surpluses and shortages of capacity and 
wide swings in its rate of growth. Spurred by government incentives, ca- 
pacity expanded by 230 percent during the 1950s, only to be utilized at an 
average of about 80 percent in the 1958-62 period. Capacity expanded by 
less than 12 percent in the first half of the 1960s and utilization rates moved 
up to 100 percent in 1965-67. This pressure touched off another round of 
7. The estimated  rates of capacity  utilization  shown in table 2 exceed 100 percent  in 
some years  because  an average  of beginning-  and end-of-year  capacity  was used as the 
denominator. 306  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1976 
rapid growth in capacity, totaling 51 percent between 1965 and 1970, and 
utilization rates again fell to very low levels. In the 1970-75 period capacity 
grew only 19 percent. 
The  aluminum shortage in  1973 appeared with  surprising swiftness, 
however. As recently as 1972 an OECD report concluded that serious prob- 
lems of excess capacity would plague the world aluminum industry beyond 
1975.8  The rapid shift to a situation of domestic shortages can be traced 
to a strong rise of aluminum demand in the United States, power shortages, 
and a drop in net imports. As shown in table 2, apparent domestic con- 
sumption rose by 18 percent in 1973. As with steel, this rise came largely 
from the concentration of the 1973 economic boom in the durable-goods 
industries  that are heavy users of aluminum. A statistical equation relating 
aluminum  consumption to durable-goods demand yielded results very simi- 
lar to those for steel: actual and predicted consumption were nearly equal 
in 1972-73; but actual consumption was 8 percent above the predicted level 
in 1974 and 5.5 percent below that in 1975. As in the case of steel, fears of 
aluminum shortages led consumers to raise their orders above immediate 
needs, causing an excessive inventory buildup in 1974 followed by decumu- 
lation in 1975. 
On the supply side, a drought in the Northwest caused reductions in hy- 
droelectric  power and major curtailments of production. This factor alone 
accounts for about a 7 percent loss of effective production and explains the 
low  1973 operating rate. In addition, the combination of devaluation of 
the dollar and U.S.  price controls reduced net imports from the levels of 
1971 and 1972. As a result of these factors, the supply available from pri- 
mary and secondary production plus net imports increased by  only 2.5 
percent in 1973 and left a gap of 1.0 million tons of demand that had to be 
met out of inventory. 
A reduction in producers' stocks of 248,000 tons filled a portion of the 
gap between demand and supply but 730,000 tons were supplied out of the 
government  stockpiles (1 1 percent of consumption). Additional sales of 510 
million tons  (8  percent  of  consumption) in  1974 nearly exhausted the 
reserve. 
While primary  aluminum  prices were subject to controls, the tight market 
conditions are evident in the 156 percent rise in scrap prices between De- 
cember 1972 and June 1974. A  strong, worldwide rise in aluminum de- 
8. Organisation  for Economic Co-operation  and Development,  Problems  and  Pros- 
pects of the  Primary  Aluminum  Industry  (Paris:  OECD, 1973). C.s-  0  CD CD C)  C)  C O  C)  C)  O  O 
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mand-equal  to  18 percent for 1973 consumption in the West, excluding 
the United States-stimulated  substantial increases in foreign prices in late 
1973. Price controls appear  to have altered the demand and supply balance 
because of the peculiar structure of the world aluminum market. Unlike 
most other commodities, aluminum is traded primarily  between producers 
rather  than between producers and consumers. Thus, even though imported 
metal was not subject to  controls, producers resisted importing higher- 
priced foreign metal, since a two-tier price structure  would upset customer 
relations. 
By the middle of 1974 the purchase of aluminum for inventory began to 
reverse itself; apparent consumption fell by 31 percent between 1973 and 
1975. The utilization of primary smelting capacity fell from 100 percent in 
1974 to 78 percent in  1975 despite extremely large accumulations of in- 
ventories by producers. 
PAPER 
Imbalances between productive capacity and demand also have been a 
recurrent  problem in the paper and paperboard industry. Unlike those in 
steel and aluminum, however, the problems of 1973 and 1974 are not at- 
tributable to unusual increases in demand or curtailment of supply. De- 
mand in this industry moves very closely with overall economic activity; 
and, except for newsprint, imports and exports are insignificant. On the 
supply side the industry has tended to delay making expansion plans until 
production approaches capacity. Because of  long lead times the new ca- 
pacity is not available for two to three years and increases in capacity have 
tended to become available during cyclical lows in demand. The historical 
data, for example, display no correlation between changes in paper demand 
and capacity on an annual basis. 
Paper and paperboard  was one of the first of the basic-material  industries 
to experience pressure on capacity in 1972 and 1973. While capacity had 
expanded at an annual rate of 4.4 percent in the 1965-70 period, expansion 
plans were greatly curtailed by the 1970 recession, and the capacity growth 
rate was only 2.1 percent in 1970-72. Only a highly unusual increase of 2.5 
percent in "found" capacity prevented a major shortgage in 1973.9  Capacity 
9. The industry  trade association  undertakes  an annual survey of all existing  paper 
machines;  determines  the capacity  of each  machine  for a base  product  mix; and estimates 
the number  of days  that the machine  can operate  during  the year.  Normally,  the industry Barry Bosworth  309 
Table  3.  U.S.  Paper  and  Paperboard  Production  and  Capacity,  1960  and 
1965-75 
Millions  of short tons, except  as noted 
Utilization 
Year  Capacity  Productionz  rate (percenzt) 
1960  40.8  34.4  84.3 
1965  47.2  44.1  93.4 
1966  49.7  47.1  94.7 
1967  52.7  46.9  89.0 
1968  55.1  50.7  92.0 
1969  57.3  54.0  94.2 
1970  58.7  53.3  91.0 
1971  59.8  55.1  92.1 
1972  61.9  59.4  96.0 
1973  64.5  61.3  95.0 
1974  66.1  59.9  90.1 
1975  67.4  52.3  77.6 
Sources: American Paper Institute, Statistics of Paper and Paperboard,  1975 (API, 1975), pp. 20-22;  and 
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Inidustry  Repor  ts: Pulp, Paper, and Paperboard.  Capacity data prior to 1972 are 
averages of beginning- and end-of-year estimnates.  Figures are rounded. 
utilization in 1972 and 1973 exceeded the levels reached in any previous 
postwar period (see table 3). 
As with steel and aluminum, a simple demand equation for paper and 
paperboard was estimated for the 1955-72 period and the result was used 
to forecast demand in 1973-75. Actual production was only slightly less 
than the predicted level in 1973 and was slightly above that in 1974. The 
13 percent drop in 1975 was larger than anticipated by the equation; but, 
since production recovered sharply in late 1975 and early 1976, the decline 
may have been related to the very large decumulation of aggregate stocks. 
In comparison with steel and aluminum, there is less evidence of significant 
purchases  beyond  needs  in  1974.10 
operates  three  shifts and seven days a week. The average  number  of operating  days for 
the industry  is about 348. There  is, in addition,  some ability  to shift the product  mix on 
individual  machines.  In 1973  the industry  added  to capacity  by increasing  the number  of 
operating  days, and by reducing  the range  of products  produced  as a means  of minimiz- 
ing time lost in switching  the product  mix. 
10. In estimating  demand  equations  for all three  industries,  I could obtain significant 
effects for relative prices only in the paper industry. Relative prices did not change 
sharply  in the years prior to 1971, and 1971-73 is a period of price controls. Relative 
prices  may have significantly  depressed  demand  in 1975,  since 1974-75 was a period of 
major price increases. 310  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1976 
The industry did encounter some spot shortages of pulpwood as a result 
of severe weather, but these do not seem to have been of major importance 
nor inconsistent with an industry producing near full capacity. The growth 
of demand appears to have been in line with a normal cyclical recovery. 
Instead, the major cause of the paper shortage in  1973 was inadequate 
processing capacity. The slowing of capacity expansion after the 1969-70 
recession is particularly marked. Even if the 1973 gain in capacity from 
more operating days and longer runs is included, overall capacity increased 
by only 15 percent in the 1969-74 period compared with 26 percent in the 
preceding five years. More  stringent pollution-abatement controls may 
have affected decisions to build new capacity, but few existing plants were 
shut down for this reason." Because net imports are a minor source of 
supply for domestic use (except for newsprint), it seems implausible that 
either devaluation or the existence of controls could have had a significant 
effect on quantities available for domestic consumption. 
SUMMARY 
Clearly, 1973 was a year of intense pressures on capacity for all three of 
these industries. And that experience cannot be explained as one of un- 
usual demand arising out of speculative inventory buildups. While pur- 
chases for inventories sustained the boom into 1974, the speculative demand 
seems to be more of a response to the 1973 pressures on capacity than a 
cause of them. Capacity had been growing slowly in all three industries. 
And the immediate problems for steel and aluminum followed from the 
unusually strong rise in durable-goods production during the recovery  from 
recession. For  paper, capacity was inadequate to  meet  even the  more 
normal rise in demand that occurred. 
In all three of these industries it is difficult to find evidence of a major 
influence of wage-price controls. On the supply side, the construction pe- 
riod for new capacity is too long for the introduction of controls in late 
1971 to have significantly affected capacity in 1973. Because imports were 
exempt from restrictions, one would expect any diversionary  impact on the 
trade balance to be reflected primarily in exports. But, since the drop in 
11. Data are available  for shutdowns  of complete  mills since 1965.  These  show a total 
lost capacity  of 0.8 million tons in the 1965-69 period and 1.2 million tons in 1970-74. 
Data are available  since 1970 for machine  shutdowns  when the complete mill was not 
closed, but there  is no earlier  reference  period. Barry Bosworth  311 
steel imports was far larger than the rise of exports, it is more plausible to 
attribute  the shift of the trade balance in this industry to factors other than 
controls, such as the devaluation of the dollar, the inflation in other pro- 
ducing countries, and the strength of demand abroad. For both the alumi- 
num and paper industries (except newsprint), imports and exports are 
minor items in overall supply and changes were negligible during the period 
of tight capacity. 
Investment  and Capacity Growth 
Normally, increases in capital and capacity are treated as synonymous, 
and most discussions of the capacity problem have focused upon the need 
for additional investment incentives. Yet, surprisingly, in these individual 
industries  the two concepts do not correspond closely. It has been possible 
to obtain accurate statistical explanations of investment at the level of indi- 
vidual industries. But for these three industries, investment expenditures 
are not a satisfactory proxy for increases in capacity."2 
As illustrated  by the data of table 4, the relationship between investment 
and growth in capacity is highly variable. Even with five-year  averages  used 
as a means of minimizing the role of lags between investment and an incre- 
ment to capacity, the two measures correspond only in the most general 
way. 
In part, this lack of correspondence can be explained by the more dis- 
continuous nature of changes in capacity. But, in addition, capacity growth 
can be accomplished by a wide range of measures, whose investment costs 
also vary widely; and a large proportion of investment may be directed at 
modernization, pollution abatement, and replacement rather than expan- 
sion. In the case of  steel, for example, estimates indicate a more rapid 
growth of both capital stock and investment during the 1960s than during 
the 1950s. Yet, capacity expanded by nearly 50 percent between 1950 and 
12. Examples  of investment  equations  for individual  industries  are provided  by Bert 
G. Hickman,  Investment  Demand and U.S. Economic  Growth  (Brookings Institution, 
1965),  and Dale W. Jorgenson  and James  A. Stephenson,  "The  Time Structure  of Invest- 
ment Behavior  in United States Manufacturing,  1947-1960,"  Review  of Economics  and 
Statistics,  vol. 49 (February  1967), pp. 16-27. The investment  series used in this study 
are based upon establishment  data from U.S. Bureau  of the Census,  Annual  Survey  of 
Manufactures,  various  issues. Thus, they do not include investment  in other industries 
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Table  4. Investment  and  Capacity  Growth  in the Steel, Aluminum,  and 
Paper  Industries,  Five-Year  Periods,  1956-75 
Billions  of 1972  dollars  and millions  of tons 
Steel  Alumirzumn  Paper and  paperboard 
Change  in  Change  in  Chlange  in 
Investment  capacity  Investment  capacity  Inivestmnent  capacity 
Period  (dollars)  (tolns)  (dollars)  (tons)  (dollars)  (tonls) 
1956-60  7.5  21.9  0.6  0.8  3.1  8.2 
1961-65  7.0  3.7  0.3  0.3  3.4  6.7 
1966-70  9.7  2.8  0.7  1.5  4.8  10.9 
1971-75  6.5  1.0  0.6  0.8  3.5  9.9 
Sources: The data on capacity are from tables 1, 2, and 3, or the sources given there. The investment data 
are from U.S.  Bureau of the Census, Annuzial  Survey of  Manufactures,  1973 (1975), and previous issues. 
Data for 1974-75 are derived by the author from the historical relationship of the establishment data of the 
Antnual  Survey  and various sources of company-based data. The investment series for steel and paper exclude 
estimated outlays for pollution abatement. 
1960  and  by  less  than  5 percent  in  the  subsequent  decade.  Finally,  some 
growth  in  capacity  can  result  from  "learning-by-doing":  increasing  the 
capacity  of  existing  machines  through  better  scheduling  and  better  main- 
tenance-which  do  not  require  investment. 
Since  1960 the steel industry has made major investments  in basic-oxygen 
and  electric-steel  furnaces.  Yet,  these  expenditures  added  almost  nothing 
to  capacity  on balance  as the  older  open-hearth  furnaces  were torn  down. 
They  were  not  kept  for  standby  capacity  because  the  raw-materials  and 
finishing-mill  capacity  to  handle  a  temporary  surge  of  output  does  not 
exist.  In  such  process-related  industries,  duplicative  capacity  at  only  one 
production  stage is of limited  value.  Moreover,  even if these  obstacles  could 
be overcome, the cost of equipping the older furnaces to meet pollution- 
abatement regulations would be prohibitive for temporary operation. 
Even in the case of the aluminum industry, however, in which there have 
been few technological changes and increases in capacity take the form of 
additional reduction units to produce aluminum from alumina, investment 
in the previous three years explains less than half of the annual change in 
capacity. In this industry, problems in the investment data may account, 
in part, for the low correlation. The Annual Survey of Manufactures at- 
tempts to include investment at plants not yet in operation by a special 
survey questionnaire to companies. The coverage of the survey is not as 
complete as that for operating plants, and it probably does not fully capture 
investment by new companies. In the aluminum industry new plants have 
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grown  from  three  in 1954  to twelve  in 1975.  These new firms  accounted 
for 52 percent  of the growth  in capacity,  but it is doubtful  that all of 
their  investment  is included  in the survey  of expenditures. 
The paper  and  paperboard  industry  provides  some of the most detailed 
data  on capacity  changes  and thus an opportunity  to examine  closely  the 
relationship  between  capital  and  capacity.  Every  year,  the American  Paper 
Institute  questions  all establishments  about  total capacity  at the end of the 
previous  year.  In addition,  firms  report  all projected  increases  in capacity, 
divided  into new  machines  and  net improvements,  based  upon  expenditure 
commitments  over  the subsequent  three  years.  Net improvements  include 
shutdowns  of existing  machines,  gains  or losses from rescheduling  of the 
mix  of products,  and  modifications  to increase  the output  of machines  that 
have  been  in place  for more  than  two years.  The actual  change  in capacity 
is not divided  between  new  machines  and  net improvements;  but, since  the 
one-year  forecast  errors  of the survey  normally  have been very  small,  the 
forecast  of new machine  capacity  should be a close approximation  to 
the actual.  Over  80 percent  of the woodpulp  is produced  at the same  loca- 
tion, so that  the investment  data  include  expenditures  for associated  pulp- 
ing facilities.  Finally, pollution-abatement  expenditures  have averaged 
about  30 percent  of total investment  since 1970.  An estimate  of these ex- 
penditures  was deducted  from the total and the result deflated  to 1972 
constant  dollars  by a weighted  average  of the national  income account 
deflators  for structures  and equipment. 
A positive  relationship  between  capacity  changes  and investment  was 
found  only for the new-machines  component: 
NMC  =  -3.79  +  0.17 I +  1.85 I-1, 
(1.2)  (0.4)  (3.5) 
R2 =  0.65; standard  error =  0.351. 
where  NMC  equals  new  machine  capacity  in thousands  of annual  tons and 
I equals  investment  in millions  of 1972  dollars.  The  numbers  in parentheses 
are t-statistics.  Although  there  is considerable  unexplained  variance,  some 
of the  individual  residuals  seem  to reflect  a variable  lag between  investment 
and measured  changes  in capacity.  The estimated  capital cost from the 
equation  of $495  (1972  prices)  per ton of annual  capacity  seems  to agree 
closely  with  industry  estimates  of the costs of new plants.  The importance 
of lagged  investment  in the equation  indicates,  on average,  that this lag 
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On the other  hand, a similar  equation  for the total change  in capacity, 
including  net improvements  as well as new machines,  yields  an R2  of less 
than 0.3. The adjustment  of the capacity  estimates  for mill closures  since 
1965  had no influence  on the results.  The relationship  for overall  capacity 
changes  deteriorated  because  capacity  changes  other  than those from new 
machines  have  no apparent  link  to investment.  Yet, these  net improvements 
(including  losses due to plant closures)  have accounted  for nearly  40 per- 
cent of the growth  in capacity  between 1958 and 1975. Many of these 
changes  within  the  paper  industry  have  revolved  around  modifications  that 
enabled  existing  machines  to operate  at higher  speed and with less down- 
time  for repairs. 
In effect,  the net change  in an industry's  capacity  is derived  from several 
components,  including  construction  of new plants,  expansion  of existing 
plants  and technological  innovations  in them,  and plant shutdowns.  As a 
result,  the capital  cost of a net increment  to capacity  varies  considerably 
over  time. Furthermore,  only part of any year's  investment  is directed  to- 
ward  expanding  capacity.  The relationship  between  total investment  and 
the net change in capacity,  thus, is likely to be highly erratic,  and the 
changes  in the former  may be a poor indicator  of the latter. 
Sources  of Change  in Supply  Costs 
Although  the investment  associated  with  a given  change  in capacity  may 
be highly  variable  over  time, expansion  of capacity  will still be motivated 
by economic  incentives.  These incentives  revolve  around  the answers  to 
two questions:  (1) What  level of market  prices  would  be required  to make 
new  plant  capacity  profitable?  (2) Do forecasts  of industry  demand  relative 
to existing  capacity  imply  that such  prices  will be forthcoming? 
Prices  have increased  sharply  in the three industries  considered  here, 
despite  the recession-induced  decline  in demand.  Between  December  1973 
and June 1976,  steel-mill  prices  rose by 55 percent;  aluminum  ingot, 49 
percent;  and  paper  and  paperboard,  46 percent.  The magnitude  of these  in- 
creases  seems to offer strong  inducement  to expand  capacity.  Yet, these 
industries  also have  experienced  major  cost increases  for raw  materials  and 
labor; they are energy-intensive  industries  strongly  affected  by the higher 
fuel prices; and higher equipment  prices and more stringent  pollution- 
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Price  increases  thus  may not have  been sufficient  to create  positive  incen- 
tives  for new supply. 
Reported  profits  within  the industry  may  be equaliy  difficult  to interpret 
as a measure  of expansion  incentives,  particularly  during  periods  of rapid 
inflation.  They  reflect  the lower,  historical  capital  costs of existing  plants, 
and, in many cases,  raw materials  contracted  for at prices substantially 
different  from  the  market  levels  relevant  for new  plants.  Also, the  economic 
effects  of pollution-abatement  regulations  are  not the same  for new plants 
as for existing  ones. For the latter,  the dominant  portion of the capital 
expenditures  have already  been made,  and the firm  confronts  the need to 
make  an incremental  capital  expenditure  to comply  with  the new require- 
ments or lose its prior investment.  But, for a new plant, the pollution- 
abatement  costs  are  equivalent  to an increase  in the price  for capital  equip- 
ment and the whole project  can be canceled  or postponed if it is not 
profitable. 
The analysis  of costs and prices  in this paper  abstracts  from risk and 
implicitly  assumes  that expected  profitability  will govern  decisions  about 
expansion.  While  this analysis  should  reveal  the basic  expansion  prospects 
for these industries,  the financing  of expansion  projects  poses two addi- 
tional  issues  for investment  prospects  that should  be noted.  First,  because 
capital-goods  costs have  risen,  fixed  contractual  interest  payments  on new 
facilities  will  be higher  than  they  are  on existing  plants  with  the same  oper- 
ating  costs.  Even  though  rational  calculations  will disregard  this, for some 
firms  this invidious  comparison  between  the fixed  interest  cost of new and 
existing  facilities  may inhibit  investment.  Second,  the higher  nominal  in- 
terest  rates  that  accompany  today's  expected  inflation  raise  the fixed  costs 
that have to be paid even  if the inflation  rate slows. This makes  a project 
financed  today  somewhat  riskier  than  one  financed  in less  inflationary  times. 
Measures  of the  supply  costs  relevant  for  new  capacity  can  be constructed. 
Recent efforts  by the Environmental  Protection  Agency to measure  the 
economic  effects  of pollution-abatement  regulations  have  produced  a series 
of detailed  studies  of several  basic-material  industries,  several  of which 
have  been based  upon detailed  cost models  of individual  processes  within 
the industry.  By combining  these process  requirements  with available  in- 
formation  on material  prices, wage rates, and capital-goods  prices it is 
possible  to construct  a detailed  cost  structure  for a new  plant  that  produces 
a specified  mix of outputs.  The methods  used  to construct  these  cost struc- 
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lowing section of this paper. Second, these cost models can be linked to 
price indexes for materials, labor, and capital goods to construct an index 
that depicts how supply costs have changed over time. Thus, it is possible 
to examine the implications for product prices of recent large increases in 
a wide range of costs such as those for raw materials, fuels, pollution abate- 
ment, and capital goods. Third, movements in the overall supply costs (in- 
clusive of both variable and fixed costs) can be matched against output 
prices as a means of determining incentives to expand capacity. 
THE COST STRUCTURE 
For each of these three industries the specific method of constructing the 
supply cost varies slightly because of differences  in the nature of the basic 
data. However, the general approach involves translating the product mix 
in a base year into production requirements  for each process. Input require- 
ments for each process were combined with input prices to develop a de- 
tailed bill of input costs per unit of output for an optimal-size plant operat- 
ing at a preferred utilization rate. 
In order to allocate capital charges (depreciation plus return to capital) 
to annual production, the neoclassical concept of a rental price of capital 
has been used in these calculations. The empirical  formulation corresponds 
to that used by Jorgenson and others in investment studies, except that 
for pricing purposes economic depreciation is taken to be straight-line over 
the life of the capital rather than the perpetual-inventory  method of most 
investment models.'3 The specific formula for the rental price is 
PB  Pk(r +  d)(l  -  pz  -  t) 
h  =  (l-p) 
where 
P=  = the rental (or service) price of capital 
Pk  =  the price of capital goods 
13. See, for example,  Robert E. Hall and Dale W. Jorgenson,  "Application  of the 
Theory of Optimum  Capital  Accumulation,"  in Gary Fromm, ed., Tax Incenitives  anld 
Capital  Spending  (Brookings  Institution,  1971).  Use of a perpetual-inventory  concept of 
depreciation  would imply  a falling  price  relative  to direct  costs over the life of the plant. 
Separate  estimates  made of the price  of equipment  and structures  were the same for all 
three industries  and were weighted  by the proportion  of structures  and equipment  ap- 
propriate  to each industry.  Useful lives are fourteen  years  for equipment  and thirty-four 
years  for structures.  All other  parameters  of the rental-price  term  except  depreciation  and 
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r =  the cost of capital 
d =  the depreciation  rate 
p =  the corporate tax rate 
z =  the present  value  of the depreciation  allowance 
t =  the rate  of the investment  tax credit. 
Thus,  bigger  investment  tax credits,  more  liberal  depreciation  allowances, 
and lower  taxes all have the effect  of reducing  the rental  price of capital 
on an after-tax  basis. 
The choice of a measure  for the cost of capital  plays a critical  role in 
allocating  capital costs since different  measures  show sharply  different 
trends.  Clearly,  the nominal  rate  of interest  is not appropriate  when  future 
inflation  of prices  can be anticipated.  In a previous  paper  in this  journal, 
William  Nordhaus  developed  an empirical  measure  of the cost of capital 
based  on a weighted  average  of the real  return  on bonds  and  the return  on 
stock.'4  However,  an attempt  to extend  his measure  through  1975  led to 
implausible  results  since an autoregressive  weighting  of inflation  rates  to 
estimate  expected  inflation,  which  he had used, gave extremely  low esti- 
mates  of the cost of capital  in the 1973-75  period  of high inflation.  Also, 
his correction  of the return  on stock for capital  gains  yields  an extremely 
volatile  measure  during  this period.  The use of this measure  of the cost of 
capital  would have swamped  the influence  of other cost changes  on the 
supply  cost. 
Rather  than  an annual  measure  of the cost of capital,  the cost estimates 
reported  in this paper  are based on a constant  6 percent  after-tax  rate of 
return,  which  is close to the average  of Nordhaus'  estimate  over the last 
twenty  years.  In a later  section  of the paper,  the significance  of alternative 
measures  will be examined. 
The estimated  structures  of costs for the three  industries  are shown in 
tables  5, 6, and  7. Conceptually,  these  cost data  vary  among  the industries 
and  should  be interpreted  with  some  caution.  First,  for the purposes  of this 
study,  cost  data  for a new,  modern  plant  would  be most desirable;  but  such 
information  was available  only for the paper and paperboard  industry. 
The costs for the steel and aluminum-ingot  industries  are based on the 
average  experience  of existing  plants.  Second,  an attempt  is made  to include 
raw-material  costs at the market  level relevant  for new plants  rather  than 
the transfer  price  for firms  that may have developed  their  own sources  of 
14. William  D. Nordhaus,"The  Falling  Shareof Profits,"  BPEA,  1:1974,  pp. 169-208. 318  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1976 
Table 5.  Costs  of Production  in the Steel  Industry, by Component 
Cost  per ton 
of output  Percentage  of 
Cost component  (1972 dollars)  supply  cost 
Operating 
Raw materials  56.89  22.9 
Ore  25.54  10.3 
Coal  12.12  4.9 
Scrap(net)  11.12  4.5 
Other  raw materials  (net)  8.11  3.3 
Power  and fuel (net)  7.09  2.9 
Direct labor  33.25  13.4 
Overhead  labor  37.79  15.2 
Maintenance  and 
miscellaneous  materials  30.43  12.2 
Sales and property  taxes  11.01  4.4 
Pollution  abatementa  8.85  3.6 
Subtotal  185.31  74.6 
Fixed capitalb 
Plant  52.33  21.1 
Pollution  abatementa  7.05  2.8 
Subtotal  59.38  23.9 
Working  capitalo  3.69  1.5 
Total supply  cost  248.38  100.0 
Source: Calculated by author from sources described in text. Figures are rounded. 
a.  Environmental operating and capital costs are those for a new plant that is constructed to meet 1983 
standards  and thus they overstate actual industry costs. Actual environmental operating costs are estimated 
at $2.30 per ton in 1972. 
b.  Capital costs per ton are estimated at $375 for plant and $86 for pollution abatement. The annualized 
costs in the table are based on a 6 percent after-tax rate of return, using the formula for the rental price of 
capital discussed in the text. 
c.  Working capital is estimated at $32 per ton and the annualized cost is 32 r/(1  -  t), where r is the cost 
of capital and t is the tax rate. 
raw materials  or have long-term  contracts.  In addition,  costs  for individual 
plants  within  the  industry  may  vary because  of location  and product  mix. 
The  cost  data  are of primary  value  as a source  of base-period  weights  for 
the  construction  of  the  time-series  indexes  of  total  costs  in  the  following 
sections. 
Steel.  The  cost  structure  for  the  steel  industry,  detailed  in  table  5,  was 
derived from  a report by Temple,  Barker, and Sloane,  Inc., for the Environ- 
mental  Protection  Agency."5 This  study  provided  detailed  input  require- 
15. U.S. Environmental  Protection  Agency, Econ2omic  Analysis  of Proposed  and In- 
terim  Final  Effluent  Guidelines:  Integrated  Iron  and  Steel Industry  (EPA, Office  of Plan- 
ning and Evaluation,  1976).  This study, in turn, drew heavily  upon process  data devel- 
oped by Arthur  D. Little,  Inc., for a report  to the American  Iron and Steel Institute.  The 
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Table  6. Costs  of Production  in the Primary  Aluminum  Industry, 
by Component 
Cost  per ton 
of output  Percentage  of 
Cost component  (1972 dollars)  supply  cost 
Operating 
Alumina  (1.93 tons)  126.60  25.1 
Carbon  anodes  (0.5 ton)  26.10  5.2 
Other  materialsa  38.45  7.6 
Power  (13 kwh)  58.25  11.5 
Labor  90.60  17.9 
Production  67.20  13.3 
Overhead  23.40  4.6 
Miscellaneous  costs and taxes  25.00  5.0 
Pollution  abatementb  0.0  0.0 
Subtotal  365.00  72.3 
Fixed capitalo 
Plant  123.00  24.4 
Pollution  abatementb  10.37  2.1 
Subtotal  133.37  26.4 
Working  capitalo  6.46  1.3 
Total supply cost  504.83  100.0 
Source: Calculated by author from sources given in text. Figures are rounded. 
a.  Primarily fluoride compounds. 
b.  Estimates of the cost of emission control of fluorides are taken from U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, Background  Information  for Standards of Perfor- 
mance:  Primary  Aluminum  Industry,  vol. 1 (Research Triangle  Park, North Carolina: EPA, 1974), pp. 48-49. 
Credits for recovery of alumina and fluoride offset other operating costs. 
c.  Capital costs per ton of annual production are derived from EPA study cited in note b and the U.N. 
study cited in text note 17. They are $900 for plant; $72 for the environment; and $56 for working capital. 
The costs are based on a 6 percent after-tax cost of capital using the formula for the rental price of capital 
described in the text. 
ments  and  outputs  for twenty-eight  basic  processes  within  the steel  industry 
based  upon 1972  operating  data  of the members  of the American  Iron  and 
Steel Institute.  Thus, the cost estimates  are based on average  operating 
patterns  in 1972  rather  than an engineering  model of an integrated  new 
plant.  The processes  that were  separately  identified  included  raw-material 
handling  yards, coke ovens and blast furnaces,  three steel-making  pro- 
cesses,  casting  and forming,  and eleven  steel-finishing  processes.  The 1972 
mix of steel shipments  was allocated  to these processes  by a production- 
requirements  matrix. Costs for each process were then measured  and 
summed  over all the processes.  Where appropriate,  credits  for energy, 
scrap,  and other raw-materials  recovery  were applied  to the gross input 
needs.  Thus,  while  the industry  uses  0.73  ton of scrap  per  ton of steel ship- 
ments,  over  half of it is generated  as an output  of other  processes. 320  Brookings Papers on Econoinic Activity, 2:1976 
Table 7.  Costs of Production  in the Paper and Paperboard  Industry, 
by Component 
Cost  per ton 
of output  Percentage  of 
Cost componenzt  (1972 dollars)  supply  cost 
Operating 
Fiber  34.46  15.8 
Other  raw materials  32.38  14.8 
Direct labor  17.67  8.1 
Energy  8.39  3.8 
Overhead  19.52  8.9 
Environmental  and OSHA 
operating  costsa  4.32  2.0 
General  sales and administration  21.86  10.0 
Subtotalb  138.60  63.4 
Fixed capitalo 
Plant  64.55  29.5 
OSHAa  1.61  0.7 
Pollution  abatementa  9.24  4.2 
Subtotal  75.40  34.5 
Working  capitald  4.65  2.1 
Total supply Costb  218.65  100.0 
Source: Calculated by author from sources described in text. 
a.  OSHA costs are estimated outlays required to meet the standards of the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act. The estimates of pollution abatement incorporate costs of meeting the (1) best practical tech- 
nology by 1977; (2) best available technology economically achievable by  1983; (3) and new-source per- 
formance standards.  Because of the focus upon costs for new capacity, the new-source performance  standards 
are most relevant. 
b.  The cost estimates exclude delivery charges in order to conform to the conceptual basis of the whole- 
sale price index. 
c.  Capital costs per ton of annual production are estimated from the EPA report cited in text note 19 in 
1972 dollars, at $443 for plant; $12 for OSHA; and $63 for pollution abatement. The annualized costs in 
the table are based upon a 6-percent  after-tax cost of capital, using the formula for the rental price of capital 
described in the text. 
d. Working capital is estimated at $53 per annual ton and the annualized cost is 53r/(t  -  1), where r 
equals the cost of capital and t Is the tax rate. 
The estimated  capital  cost per ton of $375 (1972 dollars)  was obtained 
from the data of the Bureau  of Labor  Statistics  on the gross  capital  stock 
in the steel industry.  This estimate  is considerably  less than the estimates 
of $600  to $700  per ton discussed  in recent  studies  of the industry's  future 
capital  needs.'6  However,  these  higher  estimates  of capital  costs appear  to 
reflect  a more  modern  plant  than  the industry  average,  with  a considerable 
substitution  of capital  for labor  and energy.  Also, it is doubtful  that these 
engineering  estimates  make adequate  allowance  for future capacity  in- 
creases  from the new  plants  once they  are in operation,  or for unforeseen 
16. See, for example,  Paul Marshal,  "Summary  [of a steel symposium]"  (paper pre- 
pared  for the Council on Wage and Price  Stability,  1976; processed). Barry Bosworth  321 
technological improvements  applicable  to existing plants. Such phenomena 
were important sources of increasing capacity ratings for the oxygen fur- 
naces installed in the 1960s. 
Aluminun. A study of the current  cost structure  of the aluminum indus- 
try was not available.  Thus, an estimate of the average costs in the primary 
aluminum industry was constructed from the  1972 Census of  Manufac- 
tures, a 1966 United Nations study, and various materials from the U.S. 
Bureau of Mines.'7  This industry produces aluminum ingot by electrolytic 
reduction of alumina and ships the product to aluminum fabricators. One 
major difficulty  in constructing a measure of costs is that few of the inputs 
are priced in open markets, and actual transaction prices may depart sub- 
stantially from the list price for ingot. 
The allocation of costs by category is shown in table 6. Alumina, pro- 
duced from bauxite, is the major item of operating cost; but the industry 
also uses electric power heavily. Labor costs are relatively lower than they 
are for steel, and capital costs as a percent of total costs are comparable 
with those in the other industries.  The capital costs per ton are derived  from 
the United Nations study of the early 1960s but also coincide with those 
given in a study of pollution abatement by the EPA.'8 The pollution-abate- 
ment costs are primarily  for the restriction  of fluoride emissions, and credits 
for recovered materials approximately equal operating costs. 
Paper and Paperboard. The basic data on the structure of costs in the 
paper and paperboard industry are derived from a study by Arthur D. 
Little, Inc., for the Environmental Protection Agency."9  Most of the output 
of the industry is provided by mills that are integrated with  a pulping 
facility. Woodpulp is produced primarily by three major technologies ap- 
17. U.S. Bureau  of the Census,  1972 Census  of Manufactures,  Industry  Series: Smelt- 
ing  and  Refining  of Nonzfer-ous  Metals  and  Alloys,  MC72(2)-33C  (1975); United Nations, 
Department  of Economic and Social Affairs, Pre-investment  Data for the Aluminum 
Industry,  ST/CID/9  (U.N.,  1966); and U.S. Department  of the Interior, Bureau of 
Mines, Minerals  Yearbook,  1972, vol. 1 (1974). 
18. U.S. Environmental  Protection  Agency,  Office  of Air Quality  Planning  and Stan- 
dards, Background Information for Standards of Performance: Primary Alumilnum  Indus- 
try, vol. 1 (Research  Triangle  Park, North Carolina:  EPA, 1974),  pp. 41-93. 
19. U.S. Environmental  Protection  Agency, Office  of Planning  and Evaluation,  Eco- 
nomic  Analysis  of Proposed  and  Inzterini  Finial  Effluent  Guidelinies  for the Bleached  Kraft, 
Groundivood,  Sulfite,  Soda, Deinked and Non-Integrated  Paper Sectors of the Pulp and 
Paper  Iniduistry  (EPA, 1976).  Other  plant  models  for the paperboard  sector  were  supplied 
by Arthur  D. Little, Inc. The cost estimates  were originally  shown for 1975 prices,  but 
have been converted  to 1972 prices  to make them comparable  with steel and aluminum 
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plied to pulpwood and woodchips: a high-yield mechanical process that 
yields groundwood, a low-grade pulp for such uses as newsprint; a chemi- 
cal process that yields kraft, a high-quality pulp used for both paper and 
paperboard (accounting for about two-thirds of all pulp capacity); and a 
neutral sulfite semichemical  process that produces sulfite pulp. In addition, 
wastepaper  provides about 20 percent of the raw material-primarily  for 
newsprint, tissue, and paperboard. 
Basically,  the  machines  that  produce  paper  and  paperboard  have 
changed  little: they have simply gotten bigger and faster. Different products 
can, to some extent, be produced on the same machine, but typically each 
is used to produce a narrow range of products. 
For purposes of representing  the industry, eleven integrated  paper-paper- 
board-pulp processes were combined, weighted according to the distribu- 
tion of  1973 production. Newsprint from Canada accounts for about 70 
percent of the domestic market, but in other product lines imports average 
less than 2 percent of supply and exports are about 6 percent of production. 
Net imports of woodpulp represent  less than 2 percent of the fiber supply. 
Thus, the costs of domestic production closely represent  those for the total 
market. 
The implied cost structure (in 1972 prices) for a typical ton of output is 
shown in table 7. Fiber costs-pulpwood,  chips, and wastepaper-are  the 
largest single component of direct costs but the industry is also a large con- 
sumer of energy. The other principal costs for raw materials cover chem- 
icals for making both pulp and paper. The industry is also very capital- 
intensive: the gross return (depreciation plus a 6 percent after-tax return) 
to fixed capital accounts for 34 percent of total costs. Finally, the industry 
is sharply affected by environmental regulations, which contribute an esti- 
mated 5.7 percent to the average price.20  These costs consist primarily of 
capital costs for abatement of water effluents. 
Summary. The costs for all three of these industries are dominated by 
materials, energy, and capital; labor costs are small relative to the rest of 
manufacturing.  Labor costs are also only a small element of the cost of the 
materials that they purchase. These industries are also sharply affected by 
the recent introduction of environmental controls, which appear to have 
the greatest impact on capital rather than operating costs. 
20. The pollution-abatement  costs are for new-source  performance  and are thus not 
the same as the current  costs for existing  mills. They are, however,  the costs that must 
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SUPPLY-COST  INDEXES 
The cost structures shown in tables 5, 6, and 7 provide a set of base- 
period weights for each element of cost in each industry; these can be used 
to combine price indexes on individual cost items into an overall measure 
of the costs of producing a standard product mix at various points in time. 
Since this paper focuses on the question of incentives for expanding ca- 
pacity, the relevant cost measure is  total  costs including overhead and 
capital costs as well as operating costs. 
Operating  Costs. For most of the items included in operating costs, his- 
torical measures of price change are available from the wholesale price 
index. In a few cases, such as pulpwood for the paper industry or alumina 
for aluminum-ingot  production, additional price indexes were derived from 
publications of the Department of Agriculture and the Bureau of Mines. 
Supplementary information on specific material inputs and different fuel 
requirements were obtained from the 1972 Census of Manufactures. The 
nonfarm business deflator of the national income accounts was used for 
materials and supplies that could not be separately identified or for which 
price indexes were not available. An index of rail freight rates, compiled by 
the Department of Labor, was used to impute transportation costs when 
they were not included in the basic price index. 
Changes in labor costs were measured by constructing an index of unit 
labor costs for each industry at a standardized  level of the capacity-utiliza- 
tion rate. Wage rates were measured by adjusting payroll data of the De- 
partment of  Labor by  the  ratio  of  employee  compensation (including 
fringes) to wages for the private nonfarm economy. The indexes of labor 
productivity, published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, were adjusted to 
eliminate the influence of cyclical departures  from preferred  operating rates 
by regressing the index on the industry operating rate and a time trend, 
and using the estimated coefficient on the utilization rate to  adjust the 
measured productivity to a constant utilization rate. 
The combination of these indexes for labor, materials, and fuels provides 
a measure of the change in variable or operating costs. The contributions 
of the major components in the  1972-75 period are shown in table 8. 
Clearly, costs in these industries have risen at an extremely high rate com- 
pared with the rest of the economy. While the prices in the nonfarm sector 
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Table  8. Sources  of Change  in Operating  Costs  for the Steel, Aluminum, 
and  Paper  Industries,  1972-75 
Cost  Paper 
component  Steela  Aluminlum  and  paperboard 
Percentage  change  in cost component 
Materials  63.4  76.8  43.7 
Energy  154.9  69.2  112.4 
Laborb  31.1  37.7  18.0 
Other  26.4  26.4  22.6 
Total  50.5  62.5  37.4 
Percentage  contributioni  to total changee 
Materials  30.4  65.3  56.5 
Energy  31.8  16.8  18.2 
Labor  23.6  15.0  9.2 
Other  14.2  2.9  16.1 
Total  100.0  100.  0  100.0 
Sources: Author's calculations as described in the text, and the distribution of costs shown in tables 5, 
6, and 7. 
a.  Coal costs for the steel industry are included as part of the energy component because of the common 
factors affecting recent price changes. 
b.  Labor costs include both direct and overhead labor. 
c.  The percentage  contribution is equal to the dollar change in the specific cost component as a percent 
of the dollar change in total operating costs. 
these industries ranged from 62.5 percent (aluminum) through 50.5 percent 
(steel) to 37.4 percent (paper and paperboard). The major reason for this 
difference  is that value-added prices in the economy as a whole are domi- 
nated by labor costs while these industries are affected more by costs of 
energy and raw materials. 
In the 1972-75 period, the alumiinum  industry experienced the largest 
increase in operating costs under the impact of actions by two cartels, the 
Organization of  Petroleum Exporting  Countries and  the  International 
Bauxite Association. The United  States depends heavily upon imported 
bauxite, primarily  from Jamaica. The Jamaican government raised the tax 
on bauxite from about $2.50 to $11.72 per ton in May 1974 and tied future 
taxes to 7.5 percent of the list price of aluminum in the United States. This 
rate was scheduled to be moved up to 8 percent in early 1975 and 8.5 in 
1976, although its application varies among the companies. Thus, for ex- 
ample, at a price of 40,  per pound for aluminum in the United States, the 
levy in 1975 would be about $15 per ton of bauxite.2'  This tax increase was 
reflected in a doubling of bauxite prices per ton, as reported by the com- 
21. Calculated  at .08 [.40(2000)]/4.3.  The factor of 4.3 is used to convert  aluminum 
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panies,  from  $14.84  in 1973  to $29.85  in 1975.  Since  it takes  about  two tons 
of bauxite  to yield  one  ton of alumina,  this  tax alone  accounts  for the  major 
share  of the rise  in reported  alumina  prices  from $65.60  per ton in 1972  to 
$116.35  in 1975.  In addition,  the costs of other  materials  increased  sharply. 
The increases  in energy  costs in the aluminum  industry  were less dra- 
matic  than they were  for steel or paper.  The industry  relies  heavily  upon 
electric  power, for which fuels represent  only about one-half of costs. 
Finally,  unit  labor  costs rose 38 percent  as a result  of low growth  in pro- 
ductivity  and  very  large  increases  in wage  rates  in recent  years. 
Higher  energy  prices  had the greatest  impact  on the steel industry  be- 
cause  of the importance  of coking  coal, whose  price  rose as a reflection  of 
its alternate  use as a fuel. Iron ore and  scrap  prices  also shot up during  the 
period. Increases  in wage rates in steel were comparable  with those in 
aluminum,  but the industry  had a higher  rate of growth  in productivity. 
Operating-cost  increases  were  less dramatic  in the paper  and  paperboard 
industry  than  in steel and aluminum,  but still considerably  exceeded  those 
in the rest of the economy.  Again, the major  cost increases  resulted  from 
higher  material  and energy  costs, as labor  costs were  held down  by a par- 
ticularly  rapid growth  of productivity.  Higher  pulpwood  prices  seem to 
reflect  a growing  shortage  of forest  land and reduced  lumber  production 
during  the period, which lowered the available  supply of wood chips. 
Furthermore,  chemical  costs roughly  doubled. 
Total Costs. While  operating  costs are most relevant  to the pricing  and 
output  decisions  of an existing  plant,  a measure  of the supply  cost relevant 
to new  capacity  requires  the addition  of capital  costs.  Since  the basic  calcu- 
lations of this paper  reflect  a constant  6 percent  after-tax  cost of capital, 
the capital-cost  component  of the supply-cost  index reflects  changes  only 
in the prices  of capital  goods and in tax rates.  The price of capital  goods 
for all three industries  is simply a weighted  average  of the deflator  for 
equipment  and structures  of the national  income  accounts. 
The resulting  measure  of supply  cost has serious  limitations  because  of 
the treatment  of technological  change.  Such  changes  are included  only to 
the extent  that  they  lower  labor  requirements.  Improvements  in labor  pro- 
ductivity  are assumed  to result  from factors  other  than capital-labor  sub- 
stitution  since the capital-cost  estimates  are not raised in an offsetting 
fashion.22  These  three  industries  are  not among  those  that  have  experienced 
22. For each of the three industries  considered  in this study the capital-output  ratio 
shows no appreciable  trend in the Department  of Commerce  study of fixed-capital  re- 326  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1976 
major  technological  changes  during  the last decade,  but the supply-cost 
indexes  may become  increasingly  inaccurate  measures  of the costs for a 
new plant  when  applied  over  long spans  of time. 
If any ability  to alter  production  techniques  exists, the assumption  of a 
fixed  technology  clearly  will  tend  to overstate  cost  increases  in years  follow- 
ing the base  period.  The direction  of bias  in the index  for years  prior  to the 
base  period,  however,  is indeterminate.  The base-period  technology,  even 
if known, may not have been optimal  in earlier  years, with a different 
relative-price  structure  for inputs.  On the other  hand,  the  index  may  reflect 
newly  discovered  production  techniques  that would  dominate  older  meth- 
ods of production  at any relative-price  structure. 
Ideally, the index should be constructed  with weights reflecting  the 
optimal  cost structure  in each year.  Although  this cannot  be done, it ap- 
pears  that technological  change  has been relatively  modest  in these three 
industries,  and that the adjustment  of labor inputs  captures  its major  in- 
fluence.  In addition,  this study  is concerned  primarily  with changes  in the 
index over relatively  short periods.  The indexes are constructed  for the 
decade  of the 1960s  chiefly  as a check  of their  reasonableness  in an analysis 
of cost changes  during  the 1970s.  The prices of some materials  have in- 
creased  dramatically,  but others have not. The supply-cost  indexes are 
intended  to provide  a measure  of the overall  change  in costs. 
Finally,  beginning  in 1972,  the supply-cost  indexes  include  the full costs 
for a new  plant  that meets  the 1983  pollution-abatement  standards.  While 
this inclusion  might  be reasonable  for capital  costs, it overstates  the actual 
operating  costs incurred.  In addition,  it introduces  an artificial  disconti- 
nuity  in the cost indexes. 
Steel. The  index  of the  historical  supply  cost for steel  is shown  in table  9. 
Costs for individual  materials  were extrapolated  with wholesale  price  in- 
dexes, and labor costs were estimated  by adjusting  the Bureau  of Labor 
Statistics  productivity  index  for cyclical  fluctuations  and combining  it with 
data on employment  costs from the American  Iron and Steel Institute 
(AISI).3  The market  price  was estimated  by benchmarking  the wholesale 
quirements;  see U.S. Department  of Commerce,  Bureau  of Economic  Analysis,  A Study 
of Fixed Capital  Requirements  of the U.S. Business  Economy,  1971-1980 (1975; distrib- 
uted by National Technical Information  Service), pp. 22-51. For a discussion of the 
complex  issues  involved  in measuring  input  productivity,  see Edward  F. Denison, "Some 
Major  Issues  in Productivity  Analysis:  An Examination  of Estimates  by Jorgenson  and 
Griliches,"  Survey  of Current  Business,  vol. 49 (May 1969), pt. 2, pp. 1-27. 
23. Annucal  Statistical  Report,  American  Iron and Steel Institute,  1974 (AISI, 1975), 
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price index for steel-mill products to an estimate of revenue per ton (ex- 
cluding delivery charges) of $210 in 1972. Because of the difficulty in com- 
puting costs on precisely the same basis as prices, the change in the index 
of market prices relative to costs (as shown in columns 5 and 6), rather 
than its absolute level, is the most relevant figure. 
The  index of  the  supply cost  indicates that  average costs  rose  only 
modestly throughout the 1960s. Fixed capital costs actually declined in the 
first half of the decade as tax reductions (such as the investment tax credit, 
liberalized depreciation, and a lower basic tax rate) more than offset the 
rise in capital-goods prices. With the assumed 6 percent after-tax return, 
these tax reductions were equivalent to about a 13 percent cut in the annual 
cost of capital. In the latter half of the decade, suspension of the investment 
tax credit and accelerating capital-goods prices raised the fixed-cost com- 
ponent relative to operating costs. 
Throughout the  1960s, steel prices, as shown in column 4,  rose at a 
slightly slower rate than operating costs. The slow rise of capital costs in 
the early 1960s was reflected in a slight rise in the ratio of price to total 
costs, but this was reversed in later years. In a comparison of the level of 
market prices with the calculated supply cost, market prices appear to have 
been substantially below the level consistent with the 6 percent return on 
capital used in calculating supply cost. This is not unexpected for an in- 
dustry plagued by excess capacity. 
Between 1970 and 1975, operating costs (excluding environmental) in- 
creased by 66 percent and outpaced the general inflation in the nonfarm 
business sector by 30 percentage points. More than half of this increase 
was accounted for by a doubling in the cost of raw materials, particularly 
coal. Employment costs were also 50 percent higher. The inclusion of en- 
vironmental operating costs would raise the total increase to 73 percent 
for a new plant meeting 1983 standards. 
Despite the 73 percent rise in prices between 1970 and 1975, these calcu- 
lations suggest that the ratio of price to operating costs was unchanged. 
Because capital costs have increased at a slower rate, aided by a 15 percenlt 
reduction in capital costs because of lower taxes, the profitability of the 
industry has improved, though it remains below the estimated level implied 
by a 6 percent return on capital. 
The reasonableness of the cost calculations can be roughly checked by 
reference  to income statements for the industry. The ratio of gross income 
to capital (depreciation interest, net income, and taxes) is measured as a Barry Bosworth  329 
ratio to sales.24  The use of a gross-income concept avoids the problem of 
allocating income  between profits and  replacement-value depreciation. 
Sales rather than the capital stock is used as a denominator because of 
problems in revaluing capital recorded on an historical-price basis to  a 
replacement-cost basis. This gross profit margin per dollar of sales was 
regressed on a time trend and the capacity utilization rate for the steel in- 
dustry. The resulting coefficient on the utilization rate was then used to 
adjust the gross return to a standard operating rate.25  The adjusted gross 
margin, shown in column 7, declined by one-fourth between 1965 and 1970, 
after being roughly constant in the first half of the decade. It rose slightly 
from 13 percent of sales in 1970 to 14 percent in 1975; it was 17 percent in 
1974, but this may have reflected a capital gain on inventories; and it was 
constant at 14 percent throughout the period of controls. This pattern is 
nearly identical to that derived  from the cost index and supports the notion 
that price increases  throughout the 1970s  reflected  trends in operating costs. 
Because the increases in these costs exceeded those in capital costs, a mark- 
up form of pricing did narrow the gap between the market price and that 
calculated to induce expansion. 
Some further  points can be made about the prospects for capacity growth 
in the steel industry. First, steel prices have continued to rise in 1976, per- 
haps narrowing the gap between the market price and the supply cost. 
Second, some capacity growth can be expected from "rounding out" exist- 
ing plants at a cost less than the $375 per ton (1972 prices) used in these 
calculations. Third, the industry might undertake expansion without re- 
quiring a 6 percent after-tax return on the replacement value of existing 
capital. The firms within the industry have depreciated the major portion 
of their existing plant for balance-sheet purposes  ;26 thus, a 6 percent return 
on replacement cost would imply a very high return on an historical-cost 
measure of stockholders' equity. Finally, much of the industry's capacity 
represents investments of the  1940s and 1950s. If technological progress 
during the period of excess capacity was such that it could not be applied 
to existing capital, the average cost structure for the industry in 1972 may 
24. Ibid., p. 13. 
25. This  procedure  was used  to eliminate  the cyclical  variation  in fixed  costs per  dollar 
of sales. It was not possible  to exclude  the effects  of capital  gains  on inventories,  but the 
inventory  valuation  adjustment  declined  sharply  in 1975  for the economy  as a whole. 
26. The figure  of $375 per ton implies a 1972 replacement  value of $32 billion for 
AISI firms  compared  with a net book value of plant of $14 billion in their combined 
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significantly  exceed  the total costs of a new plant  today. However,  absent 
such  technological  innovations,  the  price  increases  in recent  years  evidently 
have not greatly  improved  incentives  to expand. 
Aluminum.  The  historical  index  of the supply  cost  for aluminum  is shown 
in table 10. Because  no measure  of market  prices  for alumina  is available, 
the costs are  based  on average  price  quotes  from producers.  The assump- 
tion that  the price  paid  for electric  power  (averaging  4.5 mills per kilowatt 
hour  in 1972)  changes  in line with  the WPI  for electric  power  matches  well 
with data from the Census  of Manufactures  for the available  years.  The 
comparison  of the estimated  supply  cost with  the WPI  for aluminum  ingot 
is also uncertain  because  realized  prices bear scant resemblance  to the 
published  price.27  Some measure  of the variability  between actual and 
quoted  prices  is provided  by the estimates  of price  realizations  for Alcoa, 
shown  in column  5.28 
Operating  costs (column 1) fell during  the first half of the 1960s and 
then rose slowly for the rest of the decade.  This pattern  results  from a 
modest  decline  throughout  the period  in alumina  costs, stable  prices  for 
electric  power  and other  materials,  and falling  unit labor  costs in the first 
half of the decade  followed  by substantial  increases  in later  years.  Although 
erratic  in these data, prices seem to have tracked  operating  costs fairly 
closely  during  the late 1960s  (column  6). Their  decline  relative  to costs after 
1970  implies  a substantial  decline  in the rate of return.  Through  1972,  the 
decline  in terms  of realized  prices  appears  to have been even more severe 
because  of the extensive  use of price  discounts. 
Aluminum  prices  increased  rapidly  after 1973.  As shown in column  6, 
however,  the increases  were  largely  a reflection  of dramatically  higher  op- 
erating  costs: there was very little change in the ratio of list prices to 
operating  costs. On the other  hand,  because  the rise of operating  costs far 
outpaced  that of capital  costs,  a proportionate  increase  of prices  relative  to 
variable  costs  did  result  in a significant  improvement  in overall  profitability 
between  1973 and 1975.  By 1975,  list prices  were only slightly  below the 
supply  cost. 
27. This problem  will be reduced  in future  years because the WPI is now based on 
data collected  from aluminum  buyers. 
28. Derived  from Standard  and Poor's Corporation,  Industry  Surveys:  Metals, Non- 
ferrous, Basic Analysis (November 7,  1974), sec. 2, p. 170; and Chase Econometric 
Associates,  Inc., Aluminum  Shortage:  An Analysis  of the 1973-1974 Experience  (Wash- 
ington, D.C.: National Commission  on Supplies  and Shortages,  1976),  p. 76. a~~~~~t 
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Because  the  industry  pricing  pattern  seems  to have  been  a proportionate 
markup  over operating  costs, prices appear  to have covered  the rise in 
capital costs, and created  an attractive  outlook for expansion.  But an 
extrapolation  of the general  rise  in power  costs is inappropriate  as a mea- 
sure of the costs for new aluminum  plants.  In 1972  the industry  paid an 
average  of 4.5 mills per kilowatt  hour in purchased  electric  power com- 
pared with an average  of about 10 mills for the rest of manufacturing. 
Attractive  sites  with  low-cost  power  have  been generally  unavailable  since 
the late 1960s,  and an estimate  of 12 to 15 mills seems  more realistic  for 
1975  than  the  7.3-mill  rate  implicit  in the above  calculations.  A 15-mill  rate 
would  raise  the 1975  estimated  supply  price  of $773  by $108 per ton.29 
On the other  hand,  prices  have risen  sharply  in 1976.  In mid-1976,  the 
delivered  price for aluminum  reached  $960 per ton compared  with the 
1975  average  of $754  per ton shown  in table 10. Even with an allowance 
for some cost increase,  these prices  would cover a substantial  portion  of 
the higher  energy  costs for new plants. 
The basic  conclusions  about  the trend  of prices  relative  to costs can be 
checked,  as with  steel,  by reference  to corporate  profit  statements.  A com- 
parison  of the trends  of prices and of operating  costs implies a general 
decline  in the  return  on sales  during  the 1960s,  a continuation  of the decline 
in the 1970s  on the basis of list prices,  and approximately  an unchanged 
margin  in the 1970s  if the realized  price  is more representative  of actual 
prices.  Although  an income  statement  is not available  for the industry  as 
a whole, the ratio of gross operating  income  to sales of the largest  three 
companies  may be representative.30  This profit  measure  was adjusted  for 
29. A new mill would not face all of these operating  costs since it would incorporate 
substantially  lower  labor  requirements  and some energy  saving  compared  to the industry 
average.  Aluminum  costs in 1976  are calculated  for such a plant at over $1,000 per ton 
(excluding  delivery  costs) in a recent report on the industry;  see "Aluminum  Industry 
First Quarter  Review: The 1976-1980 Outlook," The Spector Report-Aluminum  In- 
dustry  Service  (New York: Oppenheimer  & Co., Inc., March  8, 1976),  p. 19.  This implies 
a list price  of 540 per pound  compared  with 48, in mid-1976  and a 40^  average  for 1975. 
That  cost structure  reflects  lower  labor  requirements  in return  for about 7 percent  higher 
capital  costs, and it uses a 10 percent  after-tax  return  compared  with the 6 percent  of 
tables 9 and 10. But the major difference  results  from a higher price for alumina.  The 
present  study uses producer  reports  of prices,  but they agree closely with the price re- 
ported  in the Census of Manufactures,  in which producers  are instructed  to include a 
return  to capital. 
30. These  data were drawn  from Standard  and Poor's Corporation,  Stanldard  Corpo- 
ration  Descriptions,  various  issues, for Alcoa, Reynolds, and Kaiser. The operations  of 
these firms  cover much more than aluminum-ingot  production  and thus serve only as 
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fluctuations  in capacity  utilization  and  is shown  in column  8. It reflects  the 
decline  of the 1960s,  falling  from 19.9  percent  of sales  in 1966  to 14.1  per- 
cent in 1972  and 13.4  percent  in 1973,  and rising  slightly  thereafter. 
The most interesting  implication  for expansion  of domestic  capacity  in 
this industry  is that a rise  in prices  in line with operating  costs for existing 
plants may not call out major increases  in capacity  if new plants face 
substantially  higher  costs of power  than old ones do. This conclusion  im- 
plies  that  existing  firms  would  have  to earn  an above-normal  rate  of return 
on present  facilities  before new expansion would be undertaken.  The 
aluminum  industry  has typically  operated  with a much lower marginal 
cost of power  than  other  industries.  Even  a charge  of 15  mills  per kilowatt 
hour  would  be well below  the range  of 18 to 33 mills  reported  in the May 
1976  wholesale  price  index  for industrial  power.  If this  rate  differential  was 
reduced  further,  major  price  increases  would be needed.  The uncertainty 
about the power contracts  in the Northwest,  which are due to expire  in 
the early 1980s,  also clouds  the outlook. 
Paper  and  Paperboard.  The  historical  supply-cost  index  for the  paper  and 
paperboard  industry  and its comparison  with  market  prices  are  presented 
in table 11. The supply cost indicates  that average  costs increased  very 
modestly  throughout  the 1960s,  but that the rise in supply  costs was not 
fully reflected  in prices  in the late 1960s  and early 1970s. 
The sharp  increases  in the supply  cost began  in 1972.  In part this shift 
is due to the introduction  of pollution-abatement  costs into the index in 
that year. But, in addition,  operating  costs rose by 46.8 percent  between 
1971  and 1975.  If the private  nonfarm  deflator  of the national  income  ac- 
counts is used as a general  relative  standard,  this rise exceeded  general 
inflation  by 16 percentage  points. 
Costs of fixed capital  showed great stability  over the 1960-70 period 
because  higher  capital-goods  prices  were  largely  offset  by various  tax re- 
ductions.  However,  beginning  in the late 1960s,  tax reductions  no longer 
offset  an accelerating  rate of capital-goods  prices,  and basic fixed-capital 
costs  rose  by 30 percent  between  1971  and 1975.  When  environmental  costs 
are added  in, the capital-cost  component  increased  by 41 percent. 
As the result  of these  increases,  the total supply  cost rose by 45 percent 
between  1971  and 1975.  This is a substantial  rate of inflation,  but it does 
not fully account  for the 59 percent  rise in paper  and paperboard  prices 
during  the period.  Perhaps  problems  of measuring  material  costs, or the 
weights  used  in constructing  the supply-cost  index,  contribute  to this  differ- 
ence,  but none of the individual  cost indexes  indicates  an increase  of this X  X w  s  o  o  o  o  o  X  o  o  X  X  o  o  O  =  b-;  ^~~~~~~~~~~~cl  w 
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magnitude.  The more  reasonable  conclusion  is that prices  in the industry 
have  gone  up  more  rapidly  than  costs,  indicating  an  increased  rate  of return. 
The conclusion  that profitability  has improved  is supported  by current 
income  data  for the industry.  Sales  and  profit  data  for corporations  whose 
primary  operations  are within the paper industry  are published  by the 
Federal  Trade  Commission.  The  standardized  measure  of the gross  margin 
is generally  consistent  with  the previous  comparison  of market  prices  with 
the supply-cost  index. The margin  fell from 12.6 percent  of sales in 1967 
to 8.6  percent  in 1971,  reflecting  the  fact  that  not all  costs  were  being  passed 
through  into higher  prices.  However,  after 1971, the trend was sharply 
reversed  and  the standardized  margin  rose to 16 percent  of sales,  which  is 
equivalent  to the profit  margins  of the middle  1950s.  The increase  was not 
as evident  in the actual  reported  profits  of the industry  in 1975  because  the 
operating  rate was at a recession  level of 77.6 percent. 
This  pattern  of change  in the implied  return  to capital  is consistent  with 
studies  of the overall  economy  that have identified  a declining  return  in 
the late 1960s,  with some evidence  of a reversal  in recent  years.3'  At least 
within  the paper  industry,  the downtrend  of prices  relative  to costs seems 
to have  been  reversed,  and a return  to more  normal  operating  rates  would 
make  this evident  in reported  profits. 
The sensitivity  of cost to a change  in the rate of return  on capital  can 
be illustrated  with the formula  for estimating  the rental  price of capital. 
A change  of 1 percentage  point in the cost of capital  (from  6 to 7 percent) 
would raise the 1975  estimate  of the supply  cost of paper  by 4 percent; 
coincidentally,  this would  eliminate  the gap between  the market  price  and 
the supply  cost in table  5. 
Despite its large  increases,  however,  the index may still understate  the 
cost of new supply  in the paper  and  paperboard  industry.  The capital-cost 
index of table 5 is based on a weighted  average  of the national  income 
accounts  deflator  for equipment  and structures.  These  indexes  do show a 
sharp  acceleration  in capital  costs since 1973  (31 percent  for structures  and 
25.4 percent  for equipment  between 1973 and 1975),  but these increases 
are  far less than those reported  by the industry. 
31. See, for example,  Nordhaus,  "Falling  Share  of Profits,"  and Charles  L. Schultze, 
"Falling  Profits,  Rising Profit Margins,  and the Full-Employment  Profit  Rate," BPEA, 
2:1975, pp. 449-69. Some contrary  evidence  is presented  by Robert J. Gordon, "The 
Impact  of Aggregate  Demand  on Prices,"  BPEA,  3:19  75, pp. 613-62, and the comments 
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Estimates from the American Paper Institute indicate that construction 
costs within the pulp, paper, and paperboard industry for  a fixed-tech- 
nology plant (excluding environmental-control costs) increased by 60 per- 
cent in the 1970-75 period compared with 45 percent for the economy-wide 
averages  from the national income accounts.32  Also, the industry estimates 
the cost of pollution control at a higher level than the Arthur D.  Little 
study does. If the inflation of capital costs is understated by as much as 
15 percent during the 1971-75 period, the supply cost would be raised by 
an additional 5 percent. 
In summary, it seems evident that the higher prices for paper and paper- 
board cannot be explained solely by higher operating costs for existing 
plants. The rapidly rising costs of new plant construction have provided an 
umbrella under which existing firms have been able to raise prices relative 
to operating costs. It is puzzling, however, that these price increases were 
posted  during the  1974-75  recession rather than being  delayed until  a 
period of capacity pressures. These calculations suggest that prices have 
now risen relative to costs to a point at which the expansion of new ca- 
pacity is economically attractive. Thus, a proliferation of expansion plans 
may be expected as the utilization rate recovers from the 1975 recession. 
SUMMARY 
The data on costs and prices, as well as those on operating income, tell 
a similar story for all three of these industries. The ratio of prices to costs, 
as a measure of expansion incentives, declined throughout the last half of 
the 1960s and the first few years of the 1970s. In the 1974-75 period all 
three industries have experienced an improvement in this measure. This 
rise is most noticeable in the ratio of price to total costs, but it is also 
evident in operating income. While the rise in prices relative to costs repre- 
sents a substantial recovery from the disastrous situation of  1973, it has 
not, except for paper, meant a full return to the profit position of the mid- 
1960s. 
Many observers have asserted that the recent large increases in nominal 
capital costs act as a major deterrent  to capacity expansion. The data used 
in  this study of three industries do indicate that inflation and pollution- 
abatement measures have sharply raised capital costs.  The increases in 
32. The industry estimates were supplied by Norma Pace of the American Paper 
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operating costs have been even larger, however, and prices tend to follow 
operating costs more closely than total costs. In the steel and paper indus- 
tries, prices have risen as fast as, or faster than, operating costs in the last 
few years, so that the rise in prices has more than covered the higher capital 
requirements  and has actually improved the incentives for new plants. For 
aluminum, price increases  from 1971 to 1975 did not keep pace with oper- 
ating costs, although they may have caught up in 1976. Much higher capital 
costs than those of this study have been cited for specific new plants. But 
such proposals must include considerable substitution of capital for other 
production costs, since one cannot obtain such estimates by adjusting the 
costs of existing plants for the rise in construction costs. Thus, the addi- 
tional capital costs must be offset by reductions in other components of 
total costs. 
Also, the data for these industries do account for the major portion of 
the large increases in product prices during the  1974-75 recession. Pri- 
marily, they were a simple reflection of the enormous rise in operating costs, 
particularly  fuels and raw materials. While the basic price-cost relationship 
has become more favorable today than it has been for some time, it is not 
as favorable as it was in the early 1960s. At that time, a decline in capital 
costs provided strong incentives for expansion, since a new facility could 
be expected to have lower total costs than existing plants did. In addition, 
some of the tax cuts of the early 1960s, such as the investment tax credit, 
were explicitly available only for new equipment. 
The falling ratios of prices to  operating costs experienced at various 
times after the mid-1960s by each of these industries, rather than the sharp 
rise of prices in recent years, is seen as the more puzzling factor in this 
study. It cannot be accounted for by reference to full-cost pricing models 
since the decline in capital costs in the early 1960s and their later increase 
is the reverse of the pattern of price changes. Nordhaus offers one explana- 
tion:  tax  incentives and  a  declining cost  of  capital (due to  lower risk 
premiums) sharply stimulated investment and led to excess capacity.33  For 
example, use of his measure of the cost of capital in the cost model of the 
paper industry would have lowered the annualized capital cost per ton in 
1975 by 8 percent. It would have reduced the inflation of this cost com- 
ponent from 14.5 to 7.5 percent between 1960 and 1970 and from 18 percent 
to  14 percent between 1970 and 1975. While such a measure lowers the 
estimated supply cost, it is not  sufficient to make a full-cost pricing ex- 
33. Nordhaus,  "Falling  Share  of Profits,"  pp. 192-  204. 338  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1976 
planation fit the pattern of price movements in the late 1960s. Nor can it 
explain the slowing of the decline in the margin since 1973 for steel and 
aluminum and its apparent increase in the paper industry. If the decline 
of the cost  of capital led to  overexpansion and  downward pressure on 
prices from excess capacity in the late 1960s, there is little evidence of such 
a condition in paper and aluminum until demand dropped in  1970; and 
the utilization rate actually drifted upward in the steel industry. 
Two other factors are worth noting. First, the gradual overvaluation of 
the dollar in the late  1960s intensified foreign competitive pressures on 
these industries  and reduced  margins on domestic production. The devalua- 
tion  of  1971 ended that distortion, but price controls may have frozen 
firms at a low ratio of price to operating costs a while longer. Since 1972, 
margins have stabilized or widened. Second, a business community ac- 
customed to the stable prices of the early 1960s may simply have been slow 
to adjust prices with respect to costs during the period of rising inflation 
rates. Since capital costs seemed stable on an historical-cost accounting 
basis, it may have taken the extreme inflation rates of 1973-75 to induce 
a change in pricing policies. 
The Outlook 
Although the current incentives for expansion in these three industries 
appear to be as good as they have been in many years, available data on 
current projects for capacity expansion indicate that over the next year 
capacity will be only marginally above 1973 levels. These earlier decisions 
reflect, primarily, the extremely poor profitability position of 1973-74 and 
the 1975 recession. As shown in table 12, growth in capacity between 1973 
and 1977 is expected to be only 5.2 percent in the steel industry, 8.1 percent 
in aluminum, and 8.8 percent in paper. These increases are much smaller 
than the roughly 16 percent growth in potential GNP  that is consistent 
with maintaining a constant unemployment rate for the economy  as a 
whole over this period. Thus, the imbalance between capacity in these in- 
dustries and the available labor force seems to have worsened considerably 
since 1973. While one might be reasonably optimistic about current in- 
centives for expansion, the depressed state of these markets in previous 
years has resulted in a low current level of capacity relative to the rest of 
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Table 12. Production,  Capacity, and Capacity Utilization Rates for the 
Steel, Aluminum,  and Paper and Paperboard  Industries, 
Actual, 1973-75, and Forecast, 1976-77 
Millions of short tons, except  as noted 
Actual  Forecast 
Industry  and 
output  measure  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977 
Steel 
Production  150.8  145.7  116.6  137.0  156.0 
Capacity  155.0  155.6  156.5  159.0  163.0 
Utilization  rate  (percent)  97.3  93.6  74.5  86.2  95.7 
Aluininzum 
Production  4.53  4.90  3.88  4.31  5.00 
Capacity  4.83  4.90  4.97  5.09  5.22 
Utilization  rate  (percent)  93.7  100.0  78.1  84.7  95.8 
Paper and  paperboard 
Production  61.3  59.9  52.3  61.4  64.3 
Capacity  64.5  66.1  66.8  68.3  70.2 
Utilization  rate  (percent)  95.0  90. 1  78.3  89.9  91.6 
Sources: Capacity data for 1973-76 are from tables 1, 2, and 3. For the 1976-77 period, capacity is mid- 
year estimates derived from the following sources: (1) steel-American  Iron and Steel Institute for  1976, 
extrapolated  to 1977 at same growth rate as for 1975-76; (2) aluminum-derived  from end-of-year estimates 
in "Aluminum Industry First Quarter Review: The 1976-1980 Outlook," The Spector Report-Aluminum 
Industry  Service  (New York: Oppenheimer  & Co., Inc., March 8, 1976); (3) paper  and paperboard-capacity 
survey of Anmelican  Paper Institute. Forecasts of production were supplied by Dick  Rippe, Reynold securi- 
ties, Inc., and are based on demand equations linked to a growth in overall real GNP of 6.4 percent in 1976 
and 5.0 percent in 1977. 
Production has already recovered sharply from the depressed conditions 
of 1975 and the decumulation of excess inventory is completed. Although 
no serious demand pressures are anticipated in  1976, the projections in 
table 12 indicate that utilization rates approaching those of 1973 could be 
reached by early 1978, assuming that overall real GNP will grow 6.4 per- 
cent in 1976 and 5.0 percent in 1977, and that the expansion will be led by 
a strong rise in durable-goods output. Slower economic recovery in other 
countries could provide, for a time, sufficient excess capacity to allow im- 
ports to fill any deficiency in U.S. supply; but, without a rise in expansion 
plans in the near future, shortages of these materials could become more 
significant toward the end of the decade. 
Any forecast of  demand for basic materials is particularly uncertain 
within the present economic environment, but some conclusions can be 
drawn. First, domestic capacity in these industries is not adequate to meet 
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unemployment  within  the next two years.  The margin  of supply  provided 
during  the 1960s  by excess  steel capacity  and the aluminum  stockpile  has 
been  exhausted.  Rates  of real  GNP growth  of 6.5 to 7 percent  in 1977-78 
would  require  heavier  reliance  on imports. 
On the other  hand, current  forecasts  of the most likely course of eco- 
nomic expansion  do not imply major shortages  in these industries.  The 
growth  of demand  envisaged  by the forecasts  in table 12 is above that of 
other  recent  studies.  The projected  rise in steel production  implies  an an- 
nual  growth  rate  of 3.2 percent  between  1972  and 1977;  even allowing  for 
lower  import  levels  today,  the  projected  rise  in steel  demand  is substantially 
above  the long-term  trend  of less than 2 percent.  The growth  of demand 
for paper  and aluminum  is more  moderate  relative  to past trends,  presum- 
ably reflecting  the impact  of the sharp  rise in the relative  price of these 
materials.  Both of these  industries  would  have larger  reserves  of capacity 
than would  steel. 
Yet, with  operating  rates  not far  from  peak  levels,  fears  of shortages  con- 
ceivably  could touch off a repeat  of the experience  of late 1973  and 1974, 
when  inventories  accumulated  and  buyers  ordered  in excess  of needs.  Such 
a situation  would  be unlikely  to cause  an explosion  in the prices  of these 
products  because  the historical  practice  has been to meet such pressures 
through  the backlogging  of orders.  But such a situation  of tight supply 
could disrupt  the flow of materials  to and production  in other  sectors of 
the economy. 
Finally,  this study  has sought  the causes  of cost increases  and  their  rela- 
tion to capacity  growth.  But the chaotic  pattern  of demand  over the last 
decade  must also have played  a major  role in creating  the present  imbal- 
ances between  capacity  and potential  demand.  For industries  that have 
construction  lead  times  of three  to five  years,  the major  errors  in estimating 
needs within  the current  economic  environment  are not surprising.  The 
sensitivity  of expansion  plans to current  economic  conditions  can be il- 
lustrated  by the intentions  of the world aluminum  industry  for the year 
1978,  reported  in surveys  since  the end of 1973.34  At the end of 1973,  ex- 
pansion  plans  implied  a growth  in capacity  of 35 percent  between  1973  and 
1978.  By the  middle  of 1974  that  estimate  had  moved  up to 43 percent.  But 
programs  were  postponed  and canceled  over the next eighteen  months  of 
34. "Year-End  Survey of Free World Primary  Aluminum Capacity, 1975-1980," 
The  Spector  Report-Aluminum  Industry  Service  (New York: Oppenheimer  & Co., Inc., 
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recession, and by late 1975 the estimated growth of capacity was reduced 
by  a third to  28 percent. Similarly, cyclical fluctuations are evident in 
surveys of expansion plans for the paper and paperboard industry for a 
horizon  beyond two  years. However,  because of  the long  construction 
period involved, within a two-year period there is little scope for varying 
additions to capacity from the amounts already scheduled. 
The erratic  cyclical swings from boom to bust over the last decade stand 
in sharp contrast to the first part of the 1960s, when a steady expansion of 
overall demand created a far more stable environment for the projection 
of capacity needs by firms. Whatever incentives for expansion were estab- 
lished by the demand pressures of 1973 were destroyed by the magnitude 
of the ensuing recession. The results of this study imply that, at least for 
these industries, readjustment to the requirements of a high-employment 
economy is likely to take some time. Comments 
and  Discussion 
Robert  J. Gordon:  The  problem  addressed  in Bosworth's  paper  is important 
if it motivates  economists  now advocating  policy stimulation  to modify 
their stand. My interest  in the problem  stems  from the contrast  between 
1969,  with  its 3.5 percent  unemployment  rate  without  noticeable  shortages 
of anything,  and 1973,  with its 4.9 percent  unemployment  rate and short- 
ages of almost  everything.  What  caused  the imbalance  between  plant ca- 
pacity  and labor supply  in 1973?  Will we face the same (or a worse)  im- 
balance  in the late 1970s,  and, if so, what  should  we do about  it? 
My  back-of-the-envelope  forecast  for 1978  is not reassuring.  What  would 
be the utilization  rates  in Bosworth's  three  industries  if the unemployment 
rate were  to fall to an annual  average  of 5.6 percent,  a number  chosen  to 
correspond  to Michael  Wachter's  recent  estimate  of the natural  rate  of un- 
employment  (BPEA,  1:1976)?  It should  be emphasized  that this exercise 
is different  from  the one Bosworth  attempts  in table  12.  Bosworth  forecasts 
utilization  rates  in 1977  on the likely  assumption  of modest  but not super- 
heated  growth.  I forecast  utilization  rates  on the unlikely  assumption  that 
policy is sufficiently  expansive  to reduce  unemployment  to 5.6 percent  as 
the average  annual  rate  during  1978  (this  requires  a 6.9 percent  growth  rate 
of real GNP between  the second  quarter  of 1976  and the end of 1978). 
Using some  of the data  in the  paper  and  applying  a fixed-coefficient  view 
of the economy  which  I shall  question  shortly,  I developed  utilization  fore- 
casts  which  are  compared  below  to the highest  utilization  rate achieved  in 
the periods  covered  by Bosworth's  tables:' 
1. The main elements  of the forecast  are as follows: The output projection  is based 
on the assumption  that the constant-unemployment  level of GNP grows at an annual 
rate of 3.75 percent  between  1974  and 1978.  The ratio of durable-goods  output  to GNP 
is conservatively  set at the "medium"  1972 level, not at the high 1973-74 levels. The 
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1978  Previous high 
forecast  Level  Year 
Steel  104  97  1973 
Aluminum  120  103  1965 
Paper  102  96  1972 
These startling  numbers  appear  to offer a challenge  to those economists 
who advocate  stimulating  the economy  to achieve  rapid output growth. 
How might  the forecasts  be wrong? 
First,  the prices  of all three  of these  commodities  have gone up, relative 
to all durable  goods,  by 20 to 25 percent  since 1972.  What  price  elasticities 
would  allow  these  increases  in relative  prices  to reduce  utilization  rates  in 
1978  from  my fixed-coefficient  forecasts  to the highest  postwar  values?  The 
answers  are  elasticities  of roughly  -0.12  in steel, -0.33  in aluminum,  and 
-0.12  in paper.  A pessimistic  view  is that  these  elasticity  estimates  may  be 
larger  than would apply  in a situation  in which  the relative  prices  of all 
three  materials  rose together, even  if they  look conservative  for a situation 
in which  the  relative  price  of only  a single  material  rose.  An optimistic  view 
is that  automobile  manufacturers  and  others  are  learning  how to substitute 
away  from  materials  in general  toward  labor  and engineering  skill.  I want 
to be optimistic  and suggest  that we may be able to squeeze  through  in 
1978,  but I wonder  whether  the "shrinking  exercise"  of the automobile  in- 
dustry  is being  widely  duplicated  in other  durable-goods  industries.  In fact, 
I wonder  whether  the automobile  industry  would  have invested  in shrink- 
age  at all had  it been  faced  only  with  higher  relative  prices  of materials  and 
not with  pressure  to economize  on fuel. 
A second  possibility  is that a simple  extrapolation  of capacity  growth  is 
incorrect  and that unexpected  additions  to capacity  will suddenly  appear 
in 1978.  But the recent  Commerce  investment-anticipation  surveys  are  not 
reassuring.  Total investment  plans for the last half of 1976,  net of anti- 
pollution  expenditures  and corrected  for price  changes,  are 19 percent  be- 
ratio of finished-steel  consumption  to durable-goods  output is set at the average  of 1969 
and 1973,  and the import  share  is set at the 1973  value.  The ratio of aluminum  consump- 
tion to durable-goods  output is set at the 1973  value, a conservative  assumption  in light 
of the steady historical  growth in this ratio. Secondary  aluminum  recovery  is set at the 
same share of consumption  as in 1973. No consumption  from stockpiles or imports  is 
assumed.  The ratio of paper  consumption  to GNP is set at the average  of the 1969  and 
1973  values.  Capacity  in steel and aluminum  is extrapolated  from  Bosworth's  1977  figure 
in table 12 by the average 1975-77 growth rate of capacity.  Planned 1978 capacity  in 
paper  is that reported  in the Wall  Street  Journal  (October  6, 1976),  p. 17. 344  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1976 
low 1969 in steel and 5 percent above 1969 in aluminum. Only a 50 percent 
increase since 1969 in paper suggests any likelihood of substantial capacity 
expansion in the next few years (and a 6.6 percent capacity expansion in 
paper from 1975 to 1978 is already assumed in my forecasts). 
So the possibility remains that an attempt to push the economy rapidly 
down to  5.6 percent unemployment in  the next two  years could  force 
rationing of some of these materials or a price explosion that could tilt the 
short-run inflation-unemployment tradeoff predicted by most forecasting 
models. 
The last half of Bosworth's paper, designed to tell us how we got into 
this pickle, is not very convincing. The first purpose of the supply-cost 
calculations is to examine why the output price in these industries has gone 
up so much in the last three years. The problem is that there is no way to 
evaluate the accuracy of the supply-cost estimates. Consider the artificial 
example of an output price that has increased by exactly the same amount 
as a supply-cost estimate over the last fifteen years. This doesn't validate 
the supply-cost estimate, because we do not know ex ante how the ratio of 
output price to supply cost should behave. One assumes that this "Bos- 
worth ratio" should be positively correlated with profit margins, and table 
9 indicates a possible inconsistency in steel, for which profit margins are 
down substantially from the early 1960s while the Bosworth ratio does not 
change appreciably. It would be reassuring to  know that the Bosworth 
ratio can be used in econometric work to improve equations for invest- 
ment in these industries, but variations in capacity growth do not appear 
related to prior changes in the ratio. 
Some might say that the best policy solution to the possibility of a ca- 
pacity squeeze in basic materials is no  solution-that  is, let the private 
economy grind out its own relative prices, which will clear these markets. 
We are now patiently waiting for the private economy to grind out a price 
and wage level that will eliminate the present surplus of labor; why should 
we have complete confidence that it will instantaneously eliminate a short- 
age of basic materials? In Okun's "auction" markets, prices clear every 
day, but Bosworth's three industries to  some extent behave like Okun's 
"customer"  markets, with slow price adjustment,  in which case the problem 
of excess demand may be solved by rationing less-favored customers. 
This is an example of an area in which a modest dose of government 
planning-in  the limited sense of coordination among government agen- 
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running off in different  directions with their own separate, uncoordinated, 
and possibly inconsistent objectives. For instance, antipollution and health 
and safety measures have reduced capacity, and so have Federal Reserve 
stop-go policies which have raised the risk discounts that firms apply to 
future profit streams. 
Faced with a surplus of labor and a shortage of materials capacity, the 
government should reduce the labor surplus by expanding aggregate de- 
mand until skilled workers are at work while subsidizing private on-the-job 
training to convert unskilled into skilled workers. If private risk discounts 
are substantially greater than the social discount rate, so that firms refuse 
to build capacity that the government calculates will be needed to employ 
surplus labor, the  government should  hire idle  experts to  build  steel, 
aluminum, and paper plants that can then be leased or sold to firms when 
the government produces the aggregate demand that the firms do not ex- 
pect. Essentially, the government would  operate a  "Buffer Stock  Plant 
Corporation," acting as a financial intermediary  to bridge the gap between 
its low social discount rate and pessimistically high private discount rates. 
(A precedent exists in the government-owned, privately operated Defense 
Plant Corporation.) The government may be able to justify such an institu- 
tion by trading on its superior knowledge in two areas: (1) it really does 
intend to stimulate the economy until the natural unemployment rate is 
reached; and (2) it really does not intend to impose the price controls that 
many businessmen fear would accompany a return to more normal levels 
of demand. 
John B. Shoven: One can learn a great deal from this paper. Its value lies 
in the detailed analysis, which also makes it susceptible to some criticism 
regarding the reliability of the data and procedures. The most surprising 
and educational finding is  the  lack  of  correlation between investment 
and capacity expansion. As Bosworth comments, this may suggest the need 
to rethink the role of the investment tax credit as a permanent feature of 
the tax system. It may also suggest sorting out various types of investment 
according to their effects. 
Having read the paper, however, I still face at least two important, diffi- 
cult, and largely unanswered questions: First, what is wrong with the eco- 
nomic system that leads to such imbalances in capacity and causes Bos- 
worth to predict bottlenecks as early as a year from now in these important 
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omy would  be overheated  or even  fully employed  nearly  so soon. Second, 
I am not sure that I understand  why this is a public-policy  issue and I 
don't really  see that predictions  by economists  are any more reliable  than 
those of the businessmen  who are making  the investment  and capacity- 
expansion decisions. 
To some  extent,  Bosworth  explains  what  went wrong  in 1973  and what 
might  go wrong  in the future:  he asserts  that in 1973,  at least in steel and 
aluminum,  demand  rose with unexpected  rapidity,  in part because  of the 
unusual  growth  in durable-goods  output.  I think this is a reasonable  ex- 
planation,  particularly  since  that demand  was a surprise  not only to these 
industries  but to economists  as well. 
The long-run  story, which I'm not sure I buy, is that these industries 
have  not expanded  capacity  rapidly  because  the marginal  cost of additional 
output  has exceeded  the current  price,  leaving  no incentive  for investment. 
In fact, capacity  has expanded  very  little since 1973;  and, since potential 
output  defined  in terms  of labor has risen  a great  deal, one would think 
that, if anything,  the capacity  bottleneck  will be tighter  in 1977  and 1978 
than  in the last cycle. 
The question  that I do not think  the paper  answers  but that  is most rele- 
vant both to the experience  in 1973-74  and to the prospects  is why prices 
in these  industries  did not rise  even  further.  That  would  have  induced  con- 
sumers  to conserve  on these items, stimulated  imports,  and lent the in- 
centive  for capacity  expansion. 
I am not a believer  in fixed coefficients  of production,  particularly  for 
overall  GNP. Thus, I doubt that the product  of the economy  is bounded 
by the first  bottleneck  it hits; and I think  that a price  system  should  warn 
about such potential  bottlenecks  and should  minimize  their effects.  I do 
not know why these prices  have not risen  further,  and maybe  they ought 
to do so. On the other  hand,  if the price  were  as high as the marginal  cost, 
these  industries  might  actually  have excess  capacity.  Perhaps,  in any case, 
we should  not worry  about  expanding  them.  They  are  particularly  energy- 
intensive,  pollution-intensive,  and capital-intensive.  Their share in GNP 
need  not be fixed  and, perhaps,  should  be diminished.  The aim might  well 
be a rise in the cost of using  their  products  to encourage  the replacement 
of materials-intensive  production  by more  labor-  and  engineering-intensive 
methods  in the rest of the economy.  This shift has already  occurred  in 
automobiles,  housing,  and other  sectors  in which  materials  have become 
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In summary,  I am somewhat  doubtful  about the prediction  that short- 
ages  will  recur  soon  and  most  doubtful  about  whether  this  is a public-policy 
question.  I acknowledge  and  would  emphasize  the need  that Bosworth  has 
pointed  out to try to smooth  business  cycles because  they have induced 
periodic  bottlenecks  and excess capacity;  but I do not believe  that any- 
thing special  should  be done about the capacity  issue in these industries. 
Bosworth  appears  to agree  with me, since he does not come out in favor 
of subsidizing  these industries  in general  or their capacity  expansion  in 
particular. 
General Discussion 
Several  discussants  addressed  the general  question  of how tight  capacity 
had been in 1973  and would be in a coming  expansion.  Lawrence  Klein 
offered  a pessimistic  appraisal,  reporting  that his work  with the Wharton 
index  showed  that capacity  utilization  had been high in 1973  in virtually 
all industries,  not simply  those  Bosworth  had  considered.  Furthermore,  his 
projections  pointed  to widespread  high operating  rates  in 1977-78,  occur- 
ring  at  historically  high  levels  of unemployment,  an assessment  that  Michael 
Wachter  supported.  Bosworth  stressed  that  his forecasts  of operating  rates 
in the three  industries  that he analyzed  were  not necessarily  inconsistent 
with  these  projections  for the near  future,  since  his forecasts  were  based  on 
extremely  conservative  rates  of demand  growth.  He also reiterated  his con- 
clusion that price-cost  relationships  were conducive  to capacity  growth 
now, so that any problem  raised  by today's  reading  on capacity  might  be 
solved before it emerged.  Bosworth  noted that the evidence  on Klein's 
characterization  of 1973  was  mixed:  while  the Wharton  index  implies  high 
overall  levels  of utilization  that year,  the McGraw-Hill  measure  does not. 
Indeed,  it indicates  that overall  capacity  growth  had not slowed  down  be- 
tween the 1960s  and the 1970s.  If Klein's characterization  is correct,  it 
implies  a sharp  slowdown  of capacity  growth  relative  to growth of the 
capital  stock  after  the 1960s. 
The  discussion  turned  to the  incentives  for capacity  growth  today  relative 
to earlier  periods.  Arthur  Okun  pointed  out that  it was  unrealistic  to com- 
pare  supply  cost with  current  market  price  as an indicator  of incentives  to 
expansion.  Firms  had to look beyond  current  market  price  and base de- 
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place. However,  Daniel Brill  argued  that, even if long-run  considerations 
dominated  decisions  to expand capacity,  firms  needed adequate  current 
margins  of prices  over costs to help them finance  expansion  projects.  He 
also believed  long-term  borrowing  costs, which  had not declined  much  in 
the recession  and its aftermath,  were a special  factor retarding  capacity 
growth  at this time, and called  for a closer  examination  of the impact  of 
recent monetary  policies on long-term  capacity  expansion  in both the 
United  States  and  Japan.  Wachter  contrasted  the message  he got from  the 
Bosworth  paper  with  the view  in Nordhaus'  paper  (BPEA, 1:1974). Nord- 
haus  had  found  a drop  in the rate  of profits  and  had argued  that  increasing 
cyclical  stability  had reduced  uncertainty  and induced  businessmen  to in- 
vest at lower expected  rates of return.  The current  situation  is different 
because  uncertainty  dominates  investment  decisions  and  has  raised  required 
rates  of return.  Businessmen  are  uncertain  about  the prices  of their  inputs, 
especially  energy;  about  the long-run  elasticities  of demand  for their  out- 
puts  in the face of large  price  changes;  about  government  regulations  and 
environmental  controls.  Above all, however,  they fear the possible  impo- 
sition of price controls.  Paul Samuelson  pointed out that some past in- 
hibitions to capacity growth were now greatly diminished.  Before the 
devaluation  of the dollar,  the steel industry  had felt itself at a perennial 
competitive  disadvantage  relative  to foreign  producers.  In recent  years,  in- 
dustries  such as paper  had improved  their  profitability  in the face of the 
deepest  postwar  recession.  Such  changes  favorable  to capacity  growth  had 
to be weighed  alongside  the uncertainties  in the present  environment  cited 
by Wachter. 
The discussion  emphasized  the importance  of sustained  real  growth  for 
stimulating  capacity  additions.  Samuelson  reasoned  that businessmen  to- 
day were  concerned  that the government  would  react  with contractionary 
policies  as soon as the inflation  rate  increased,  so that new  capacity  would 
prove  to be unneeded  and unprofitable.  Bosworth  stressed  his belief  that 
stop-go  policies  inhibit  capacity  growth.  Plans  for expansion  are dropped 
during  recessions.  This was true of the paper industry  in 1970 and the 
aluminum  industry  in 1974-75.  He believed  that attempts  to cure  inflation 
by recession  contribute  to even higher  inflation  in the future  because  of 
their  impact  on capacity  growth. 
Richard  Cooper suggested  that speculative  demand  for raw materials 
rather  than  capacity  shortages  could  explain  the price  increases  of 1973-74. 
This alternative  hypothesis  might be tested by comparing  the price in- Barry Bosworth  349 
creases  for raw  materials  and  processed  products.  H-le  noted  that  prices  had 
risen sharply,  not only in the industries  Bosworth  analyzed,  but also in 
many others  that had shown  no evidence  of capacity  shortages.  Further- 
more,  the declines  in net U.S. imports  of aluminum  and steel  in 1973  were 
highly  unusual  for a boom year. Although  the dollar devaluation  might 
have  played  some  role in this decline,  this evidence  points  to the existence 
of strong  demand,  including  speculative  demand,  elsewhere.  He felt that  to 
complete  his story, Bosworth  would have to find evidence  of capacity 
shortages  elsewhere  in the world. 
Robert  Hall  believed  that  the concern  over  bottlenecks  was  exaggerated, 
because  increased  imports  would alleviate  them. Others  pointed  out that 
the synchronization  of the international  business  cycle had reduced  the 
importance  of other  countries  as sources  of supply;  their  capacity  would 
be tight  at the same  time  ours  was,  repeating  what  may  have  been  the 1973 
experience.  Robert J. Gordon added that the devaluation  of the dollar 
meant  that cheap  imports  were  no longer  available.  But Samuelson  noted 
the other  side of this coin: the dollar  devaluation  had improved  the com- 
petitive  situation  of American  industry  and  would  encourage  expansion  for 
the first  time  in many  years.  Lawrence  Krause  noted  that Bosworth's  sup- 
ply-cost  numbers,  by assuming  fixed  coefficients,  ignored  the savings  that 
new  technologies  would  bring  about  on raw  material  and  labor  inputs,  and 
thus understated  the incentives  to capacity  addition  that today's prices 
provided. 
Several  participants  discussed  whether  special  government  policies,  such 
as Gordon  had suggested,  were  called  for to deal with  capacity  problems. 
Charles  Bolt offered  several  suggestions:  antitrust  measures  aimed  at pro- 
ducers  of basic  materials  who also dominated  the distribution  of imports; 
a system  something  like that used  in Sweden,  under  which  the government 
sets aside  a portion  of corporate  taxes  and then  determines  when  and  how 
this should  be released  for investment  spending;  and taxes on multiple- 
ordering  practices.  Brill  stressed  the need  for lower  long-term  interest  rates 
rather  than  any  special  programs.  John  Shoven  questioned  the  premise  that 
the government  should  intervene  in this instance.  He emphasized  his faith 
in the  price  system  and  argued  that  the uncertainties  that  might  make  busi- 
nessmen  cautious  about  expanding  reflected  social as well as private  risks. 
He did not believe that economists  could do better than the industries 
themselves  in forecasting  the demands  for their  products.  Okun  elaborated 
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holdings  if predictable  shortages  were  imminent.  Gordon  replied  that the 
government  might  indeed  be better  informed  than  private  investors,  espe- 
cially  in situations  in which  the  uncertainties  hinged  on government  policies. 
He also questioned  relying  on the price system,  when, as Bosworth  had 
pointed  out, shortages  probably  would  be dealt  with  by multiple-ordering 
practices  and rationing.  Robert Solow maintained  that the monetary 
authorities  were  likely to ignore  the difference  between  relative  price ad- 
justments  needed  to eliminate  individual  shortages  and a general  rise in 
prices.  They  would  intervene  before  the system  had time to "grind  out its 
solution,"  thus causing another  recession.  Bosworth  had sympathy  for 
Shoven's  viewpoint,  but  felt that  the  contagious  nature  of fears  about  short- 
ages  was  a reason  for concern.  Once  fears  of shortages  get started,  they  are 
difficult  to stop, as they were in  1974 before the deepening  recession 
brought  them  to a halt. 